

Angela Mendelovici

Curriculum Vitae

Department of Philosophy, Stevenson Hall
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7

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Current employment

- Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, The University of Western Ontario (2010–*present*) (UWO)
- Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, UWO
- Associate Member, Brain and Mind Institute, UWO

Past employment

- Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University (Jan. 2011–July 2011, Jan. 2012–July 2012) (ANU)

Education

- Ph.D., Philosophy, Princeton University (2005–2010)
- B.A., Philosophy Honors (Minor in Psychology), McGill University (2001–2005)

Research areas

- Philosophy of mind (intentionality, consciousness, perception, concepts)

Publications and works in progress

Monograph

- *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, accepted for publication by Oxford University Press, USA, Mind Series (expected early 2018).

Journal articles

- Mendelovici, A. (2016). Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. *Disputatio 8* (42):57–92.

- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2014). Naturalizing intentionality: Tracking theories versus phenomenal intentionality theories. *Philosophy Compass* 9 (5):325–337.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Intentionalism about moods. *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1):126–136.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation (2013). *Philosophical Studies* 165 (2):421–443.
- Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P., **Mendelovici, A.**, McGeer, V., and Wheatley, T. (2011). Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 23 (10):3162–3180.

Other articles

- **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Olfactory experience, content, and justification. In Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia (eds.). *The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (forthcoming). Consciousness and intentionality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). *Non-propositional Intentionality*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). The combination problem is a problem for everyone. In William Seager (ed.). *Handbook for Panpsychism*. Routledge.
- Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Phenomenal intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/>
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Pure intentionalism about moods and emotions. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind*. Routledge, pp. 135–157.
- Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici A.** (2014). Tracking intentionalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers*. Continuum, pp. 209-235.

Book reviews

- **Mendelovici A.** (2014). Review of Dominic Gregory’s *Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and their Contents*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
- **Mendelovici A.** and Bourget, D. (2013). Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (eds.) *Cognitive Phenomenology*. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 91 (3):601–604.
- **Mendelovici A.** (2013). Review of Tim Bayne’s *The Unity of Consciousness*. *Philosophical Psychology* 26 (1):158–162.

- **Mendelovici A.** and Nielsen, K. (2012). Review of Steward Goetz and Charles Taliaferro’s *A Brief History of the Soul*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

Works in progress

- Olfactory objects: Everyday objects and bare olfactory objects
- Immediate and reflective senses (in preparation for Title TBA, eds. Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado, and Dena Shottenkirk, publisher TBA)

Presentations

- “The superficial character and deep nature of intentional states and contents”
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, June 2017
- “Fixing reference on intentionality and the mismatch problem”
“The phenomenal intentionality theory and self-ascriptivism”
 - Central European University Summer School, “Mind, Matter, and Consciousness,” July 21, 2016
- “Phenomenal intentionality in thought”
 - Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network (SPAWN), Consciousness, 10th Anniversary Conference, July 2015 (upcoming)
 - Canadian Philosophical Association, Symposium of Intentionality, June 2013
- “Immediate and reflective senses”
 - Oakland University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2015 (upcoming)
 - Victoria University at Wellington, Department of Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Invited Talk, May 2014
 - Keynote address for PhilMiLCog 2014, The University of Western Ontario, May 2014
- “Phenomenal intentionality and the derived content strategy” (with David Bourget)
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, Symposium on Phenomenal Intentionality, May 2014
- “Is the phenomenal intentionality theory naturalistic?” (with David Bourget)
 - Mardi Gras in Mind, Tulane University, February 2014
- “Intentionalism about moods”
 - 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, August 2013
- “Comments on David Bourget ‘Representationalism and perceptual distortion’”
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, June 2013
- “Mental representation is not a relation”

- American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March 2013
- University of Toronto, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, March 2013
- McMaster University, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, March 2013
- “How concepts get their contents”
 - University of Wisconsin–Madison, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, February 2013
 - Yeshiva University, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, February 2013
- “The derived content view” (with David Bourget)
 - Interfaces of the Mind, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, July 2012
 - Intentionality and Phenomenality Conference, Crete, June 2012
- “The role of phenomenal consciousness in thought”
 - University of Melbourne, Philosophy Department Seminar Series, March 2012
 - Mind and Consciousness Conference, The University of Western Australia, February 2012
 - Hong Kong University, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, January 2012
- “The conscious experience of pain”
 - Wellesley College, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, November 2011
- “Intentionalism about emotions”
 - Wayne State University, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, Oct. 2011
 - Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2011
 - Charles Sturt University at Wagga Wagga, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, July 2011
 - ANU Women’s Work-in-Progress Seminar, May 2011
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, Sept. 2009
- “Phenomenal intentionality meets conceptual atomism”
 - European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Milan, Sept. 2011
- “Do phenomenal characters compose?”
 - Consciousness at the Beach, The Australian National University, July 2011
- “Perceptual subcapacities: Tracking and representation”
 - Perceptual Capacities Workshop, The Australian National University, July 2011
- “All cognitive content is conscious content”
 - The Australian National University, Philosophy Seminar, Jan. 2011
- “A moderate position on the phenomenology of thought”
 - The University of Western Ontario, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - Washington University at St. Louis, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - The University of Waterloo, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, Jan. 2010

- Cornell University, Philosophy Department Invited Talk, Feb. 2010
- “Comments on Pekka Väyrynen’s ‘Thick concepts and presupposition’”
 - Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Aug. 2010
- “Comments on Chandra Sripada’s ‘The deep self model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action’”
 - Moral Psychology Conference, Princeton University, Nov. 2008
- “The varieties of content”
 - Philosophical Society, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Aug. 2008
- “Derived mental representation”
 - Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2008
- “Does intentional content supervene on phenomenal character?”
 - Eighth Annual International Graduate Conference in Philosophy, “Experience and Truth,” University of Toronto, May 2008
- “Systematic error about color and what to do about it”
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, April 2008
- “Derived mental representation and the phenomenology of thought”
 - University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2008
- “Causal theories of mental representation and the mismatch problem”
 - Eleventh Annual Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, CUNY, March 2008
 - University of Minnesota Graduate Philosophy Conference, “Philosophy on Ice,” Feb. 2008
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, Nov. 2007

Teaching

2016–2017

- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (Section 200)
- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (Section 650)

2015–2016

- Philosophy 4410F/9617A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Philosophy 4410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind

2013–2014

- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
- Philosophy 4410G/9611A: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind
- Consciousness and Intentionality Prospectus Course (prospectus reading course)

2012–2013

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9661A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Propositional Attitudes Prospectus Course (graduate reading course)
- Panpsychism (graduate reading course)

2011–2012

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9605: Concepts (graduate/undergraduate seminar)

2010–2011

- Philosophy 2260F: Introduction to Philosophy of Language (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4991F/9407: Problems in Philosophy: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Foundations Seminar: Mental Representation (graduate seminar, ANU)
- Non-Veridical Representation (undergraduate reading course)

Graduate supervision (PhD and MA)

- Shawn Bartlett, on representationalism and evaluative states (PhD supervisor, ongoing)
- Peter Verveniotis, on linguistic representation and phenomenal intentionality (PhD joint-supervisor, ongoing)
- Kyler Furlotte, *Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: Is Ontology Relevant?* (MA supervisor, 2016)
- Stephen Pearce, *A Pure Representationalist Account of the Attitudes* (PhD supervisor, 2016)
- Christopher Young, *Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact* (PhD joint-supervisor, 2015)
- Gregory Horne, *The Root of the Combination Problem for Panpsychism* (MA supervisor, completed 2013)

- Stephen Pearce, *Sense Modalities and Representationalism* (MA supervisor, completed 2011)

Graduate advising (PhD)

- Andrew Peterson, on the vegetative state and decision-making capacity (completed 2016)
- Nicolas McGinnis, *Reference and Experiment* (completed 2015)
- O’Neal Buchanan, on empathy (completed 2015)
- Matthew Ivanowich, on representationalism (completed 2015)
- James Southworth, *William James Theory of Emotion* (completed 2014)

Awards

- Teaching Honour Roll, UWO, 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016

Service

- Workload Committee, UWO, 2016–17
- Admissions Committee, UWO, 2016–17
- Appointments Committee, UWO, 2016–17
- Language and Mind Area Chair, UWO, 2012–2014
- Chair of Visiting Speakers’ Committee, UWO, 2013-2014
- Appointments Committee, UWO, 2012–2013
- Canadian Philosophical Association Programme Committee, 2013-2014
- Co-chair of the Committee for Women’s Concerns, UWO, 2011–2013
- Visiting Speakers Committee, UWO, 2011–2012
- Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, UWO, 2010–2012
- Reviewer for *Mind*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Synthese*, *The Monist*, *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Philosophy Compass*, *The European Journal of Philosophy*, *Bloomsbury Publishing*, *Oxford University Press UK*, *Routledge*.

June 9, 2017