

Angela Mendelovici

Curriculum Vitae

Department of Philosophy, Stevenson Hall
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Employment

Current employment

- Associate Professor (with tenure), Department of Philosophy, The University of Western Ontario (Western University, 2018–present)

Past employment

- Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Western University (2010–2018)
- Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University (Jan. 2011–July 2011, Jan. 2012–July 2012)

Education

- Ph.D., Philosophy, Princeton University (2005–2010)
- B.A., Philosophy Honors (Minor in Psychology), McGill University (2001–2005)

Areas of specialization

- Philosophy of mind (intentionality, consciousness, perception, concepts)

Areas of competence

- Philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, critical thinking

Publications and works in progress

Monograph

1. Mendelovici, A. (2018). *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Oxford University Press.

Articles

2. **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions. In Eric Schwitzgebel and Jonathan Jong (eds.). *What is Belief?* Oxford University Press.
3. **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects). In Berit Brogaard, Robert French, and Otavio Bueno (eds.). *The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception*. Synthese Book Series.
4. **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Three Perspectives on Perspective. In Mitchell Green and Jan Michel (eds.). *William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method*. Palgrave Macmillan.
5. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (forthcoming). Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality. *Philosophical Perspectives*. (Published online in 2023)
6. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, B. (forthcoming). Explanationist versus Probabilistic Accounts of Genealogical Debunking. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*.
7. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Tracking Representationalism: Lycan, Dretske, and Tye. In Andrew Bailey (ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, 2nd Edition*. Continuum. (Revision of 2014 version)
8. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue. *Argumenta*.
9. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Is *Narrow Content*’s “Narrow Content” Narrow Content? *Inquiry*. (Symposium on Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne’s *Narrow Content*, published online in 2022)
10. **Mendelovici, A.** (2023). Attenuated Representationalism. *Analysis*. (Critical notice of David Papineau’s *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience*)
11. **Mendelovici, A.** (2023). Truth and Content in Sensory Experience. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 3*. Oxford University Press, pp. 318–338. (Critical notice of David Papineau’s *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience*)
12. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2022). Kolers Without Colors, Representation without Intentionality. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 105 (2): 476–483. (Symposium on Karen Neander’s *A Mark of the Mental*)
13. **Mendelovici, A.** (2021). Brentano on Phenomenal and Transitive Consciousness, Unconscious Consciousness, and Phenomenal Intentionality. *European Journal of Philosophy* 31: 458–467. (Symposium on Uriah Kriegel’s *Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value*)
14. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2020). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press, pp. 560–585.
15. **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions. In Luis R. G. Oliveira and Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.). *Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker*. Routledge.

16. **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs. In Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia (eds.). *The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision*. Oxford University Press, pp. 99–117.
17. **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). The Combination Problem is a Problem for Everyone. In William Seager (ed.). *Handbook for Panpsychism*. Routledge.
18. **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Reply to Philip Woodward’s Review of *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*. *Philosophical Psychology* 32 (8): 1261–1267.
19. **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Immediate and Reflective Senses. In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado, and Dena Shottenkirk (eds.). *Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics*. Routledge.
20. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Phenomenal Intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality>>. (Revision of 2016 version)
21. **Mendelovici, A.** (2018). Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). *Non-propositional Intentionality*. Oxford University Press.
22. **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation. *Disputatio* 8 (42): 57–92.
23. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality>>.
24. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. *Philosophy Compass* 9 (5): 325–337.
25. **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Pure Intentionalism about Moods and Emotions. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind*. Routledge, pp. 135–157.
26. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Tracking Representationalism: Lycan, Dretske, and Tye. In Andrew Bailey (ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers*. Continuum, pp. 209–235.
27. **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Intentionalism about Moods. *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1): 126–136.
28. **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation (2013). *Philosophical Studies* 165 (2): 421–443.
29. Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P., **Mendelovici, A.**, McGeer, V., and Wheatley, T. (2011). Is Morality Unified? Evidence that Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 23 (10): 3162–3180.

Book reviews

30. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2023). Review of Michael Tye's *Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass*. *Philosophical Review* 132 (2): 338–343.
31. **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). Review of Laura Candiottio's (ed.) *The Value of Emotions for Knowledge*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
32. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2019). Review of Karen Neander's *A Mark of the Mental*. *Philosophical Review* 128 (3):378–385.
33. **Mendelovici A.** (2014). Review of Dominic Gregory's *Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and their Contents*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
34. **Mendelovici A.** and Bourget, D. (2013). Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague's (eds.) *Cognitive Phenomenology*. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 91 (3):601–604.
35. **Mendelovici A.** (2013). Review of Tim Bayne's *The Unity of Consciousness*. *Philosophical Psychology* 26 (1):158–162.
36. **Mendelovici A.** and Nielsen, K. (2012). Review of Steward Goetz and Charles Taliaferro's *A Brief History of the Soul*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

Interviews and public engagement

1. “How Does Consciousness Connect Us to Reality? Part II” (2022). Interview on Philip Goff and Keith Frankish's *Mind Chat*. <<https://youtu.be/09gi3Mr3o8w>>
2. “What is Intentionality? Phenomenal Intentionality Theory and the Role of Qualia” (2022). Interview on Tevin Naidu's *The Mind-Body Solution*. <<https://youtu.be/WhgbZz-iJ4k>>
3. “Intentionality, Consciousness, and Panpsychism (with Professor Angela Mendelovici)” (2019). Interview on Cody Turner's *Tent Talks*. <<https://codyturnercreations.com/2019/08/17/37-intentionality-consciousness-and-panpsychism-with-professor-angela-mendelovici/>>
4. “Amy Kind and Angela Mendelovici on Representationalism About Moods” (2013). *Philosophy TV* episode with Amy Kind. <<http://www.philostv.com/amy-kind-and-angela-mendelovici>>
5. “A Sample Philosophy Paper” (2010). <http://prezi.com/z4h1_fwilbxj>

Presentations

Upcoming presentations

1. TBA
 - Author Meets Critics Session on David Pitt's *The Quality of Thought*, Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division (Pacific APA), March 2024 (invited)

2. TBA
 - DEX 9, University of California—Davis, April 2024 (invited)
3. TBA
 - Philosophical Briefing, Western University, Department of Philosophy, April 2024 (invited)
4. Does Intentionality Connect Us to the World?
 - Symposium on Consciousness and Cognition (organized by Angela Mendelovici and David Bourget), Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2024 (refereed)

Past presentations

5. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
 - Invited Session on Perceptual Particularity, Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Eastern APA), January 2024 (invited)
6. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
 - Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience (PPN) Research Seminar, University of Glasgow, November 2023 (invited)
7. Commentary on John Doris’ “Of Sharks and Citations: Harman on Peer Review”
 - Harmania: Conference in Honor of Gilbert Harman, Princeton University, September–October 2023 (invited)
8. Does Intentionality Connect Us to the World?
 - Philosophy of Mind Works in Progress Group, July 2023 (invited)
9. Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality
 - UC Santa Cruz Colloquium Series, May 2023 (invited)
10. Phenomenal Intentionality
 - Guest Presentation at Christopher Stratman’s Mental Representation seminar at University of Texas at San Antonio, April 2023 (invited)
11. Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality
 - Toronto Metropolitan University Colloquium Series, April 2023 (invited)
12. Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality
 - Philosophy of Mind Works in Progress Group, April 2023 (invited)
13. Phenomenal Intentionality
 - Guest Presentation at Adam Pautz and Christopher Hill’s Mental Representation seminar at Brown University, December 2022 (invited)

14. What Makes Teleosemantics a Theory of Content?
 - 44th Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy in Honor of Ruth Millikan, November 2022 (invited)
15. How to Reject the Act-Object Distinction and Be a Russellian Monist
 - Keynote speaker at Russell 150 Conference, The Department of Theoretical Philosophy and the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Bucharest and the Constantin Rădulescu-Motru Institute of Philosophy and Psychology at the Romanian Academy, November 2022 (invited)
16. Emotion as Reliable Misrepresentation
 - Feeling Towards: The Unity of Phenomenology and Intentionality in Emotion, University of Bonn and University of Würzburg, July 2022 (invited)
17. How to Reject the Act-Object Distinction and Be a Russellian Monist
 - Analysis of Mind Centenary: History and Future of Russellian Monism, McMaster University, June 2022
18. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
 - LEMM Group Talk, University of Toronto, April 2022 (invited)
19. Panpsychism: Ignorance and Acquaintance
 - Workshop on the Combination Problem, February 2022 (invited)
20. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
 - How are we able to think about things? Umeå University, October 2021 (invited)
21. Deep Internalism
 - Keynote speaker at Analytic Phenomenology, Intentionality and Consciousness, IUSS: The Mark of the Mental Project, October 2021 (invited)
22. Phenomenal Intentionality and Voluntarism About Truth and Reference
 - Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2021 (refereed)
23. Debunking Arguments Against Color
 - Invited Session on Color Debunking Arguments, Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division (Pacific APA), April 2021 (initially scheduled for April 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19, invited)
24. Radical Internalism
 - Indiana University, Bloomington, Department of Philosophy, April 2021 (invited)
25. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
 - Undergraduate Philosophy Club, Indiana University, Bloomington, Department of Philosophy, April 2021 (invited)

26. Phenomenal intentionality
 - Ned Block and David Chalmers’ Mind & Language seminar “Theories of intentionality,” New York University, April 2021 (invited)
27. Summary of *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality* and Reply to Critics
 - Author meets critics session on my *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality* (organizer: Dimitria Gatzia; critics: Elijah Chudnoff, Amy Kind, and Adam Pautz), Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP), December 2020 (initially scheduled for March 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19, invited)
28. Commentary on Sarah Arnaud and Kate Pendoley’s “Intentionalism and the Understanding of Emotion Experience”
 - Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, December 2020 (initially scheduled for March 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19, invited)
29. Radical Internalism
 - Oxford University, Department of Philosophy, Metaphysics of Consciousness Series, February 2021 (invited)
30. Radical Internalism
 - Summer of Consciousness Conference (organized by Uriah Kriegel), June 2020 (invited)
31. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
 - Concordia University Philosophy Colloquium Series, 2019 (invited)
32. Complexity Without Combination: Panpsychism Without the Combination Problem
 - Session on Panpsychism (organized by Philipp Goff), The Science of Consciousness Conference, Interlaken, June 2019 (invited)
33. Phenomenal Intentionality, Thought, and Cognitive Phenomenology
 - Central European University Summer School, “Cognitive Phenomenology,” July 2019 (invited)
34. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
 - Central European University Summer School, “Cognitive Phenomenology,” July 2019 (invited)
35. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
 - Phenomenal Intentionality (workshop based on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019) (invited)
36. Thoughts, Unconscious States, and Other Challenging Cases for the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
 - Phenomenal Intentionality (workshop based on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019) (invited)

37. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
 - Phenomenal Intentionality (workshop based on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019) (invited)
38. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
 - The Role and Reality of Consciousness, University of Crete, Rethymnon, Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, May 2019 (invited)
39. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
 - Phenomenal Intentionality Workshop, St. Raffaele University, Milan, May 2019 (invited)
40. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
 - Session on Perception, Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, March 2019 (invited)
41. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
 - University of Notre Dame, Philosophy Department Colloquium, April 2019 (invited)
42. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
 - Winter Workshop in Philosophy of Perception, UC San Diego, February 2019 (invited)
43. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
 - Department of Philosophy and Education Science, University of Turin, May 2019 (invited)
44. Phenomenal Intentionality, Thought, and Cognitive Phenomenology
 - Cognitive Phenomenology, Central European University Summer School, May 2019 (invited)
45. Non-Relational Views of Phenomenal Intentionality and Truth and Reference to the Mind-Independent World
 - Cognitive Phenomenology, Central European University Summer School, May 2019 (invited)
46. Doing Without External Acquaintance
 - Acquaintance and Direct Grasp, Institut Jean Nicod, July 2018 (invited)
47. Using Technology to Improve Critical Thinking Skills
 - Getting Students to Think Critically: Perspectives from the Disciplines Panel Presentation and Discussion, Fall Perspectives on Teaching Conference, Western University, August 2017 (invited)
48. Mental Combination
 - Russellian Monism: Time for the Details, Central European University, August 2017 (invited)
49. The Hard Problem of Mental Combination
 - Consciousness and Intentionality, University of Crete, Athens, July 2017 (invited)

50. The Deep Natures and Superficial Characters of Intentional States and Contents
 - Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2017 (refereed)
51. Fixing Reference on Intentionality and the Mismatch Problem
 - Central European University Summer School, “Mind, Matter, and Consciousness,” July 21, 2016 (invited)
52. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory and Self-Ascriptivism
 - Central European University Summer School, “Mind, Matter, and Consciousness,” July 21, 2016 (invited)
53. Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought
 - Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network (SPAWN) 10: Consciousness, Syracuse University, July 2015 (invited)
54. Immediate and Reflective Senses
 - Oakland University Department of Philosophy Colloquium, March 2015 (invited)
55. Immediate and Reflective Senses
 - Victoria University at Wellington, May 2014 (invited)
56. Immediate and Reflective Senses
 - PhilMiLCog Keynote, June 2014 (invited)
57. The Derived Content View (with David Bourget)
 - Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2014 (invited)
58. The Derived Content View (with David Bourget)
 - Interfaces of the Mind, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, July 2012 (invited)
59. The Derived Content View (with David Bourget)
 - Intentionality and Phenomenality Conference, Crete, June 2012 (invited)
60. Is the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory Naturalistic? (with David Bourget)
 - Mardi Gras in Mind Workshop, Tulane University, February 2014 (invited)
61. Intentionalism About Moods
 - 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, August 2013 (refereed)
62. Phenomenal Intentionality About Thought
 - Cognitive Phenomenology Workshop, Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2013 (invited)
63. Comments on David Bourget “Representationalism and Perceptual Distortion”
 - Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2013 (invited)
64. The Monadic View of Intentionality
 - American Association of Philosophy, Pacific Division, March 2013 (invited)

65. The Monadic View of Intentionality
 - University of Toronto, March 2013 (invited)
66. The Monadic View of Intentionality
 - McMaster University, February 2013 (invited)
67. How Concepts Get Their Contents
 - University of Wisconsin—Madison, February 2013 (invited)
68. How Concepts Get Their Contents
 - Yeshiva University, February 2013 (invited)
69. The Role of Phenomenal Consciousness in Thought
 - University of Melbourne Seminar Series, March 2012 (invited)
70. The Role of Phenomenal Consciousness in Thought
 - Mind and Consciousness Conference, The University of Western Australia, February 2012 (invited)
71. The Role of Phenomenal Consciousness in Thought
 - Hong Kong University, January 2012 (invited)
72. The Conscious Experience of Pain
 - Wellesley College, November 2011 (invited)
73. Intentionalism About Emotions
 - Wayne State University, October 2011 (invited)
74. Intentionalism About Emotions
 - Australasian Association of Philosophy, Dunedin, July 2011 (refereed)
75. Intentionalism About Emotions
 - Charles Sturt University, July 2011 (invited)
76. Intentionalism About Emotions
 - The Australian National University Women’s Work-in-Progress Seminar, May 2011 (invited)
77. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets Conceptual Atomism
 - European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Milan, September 2011 (refereed)
78. Do Phenomenal Characters Compose?
 - Consciousness at the Beach IV, The Australian National University, July 2011 (invited)
79. Perceptual Subcapacities: Tracking and Representation
 - Perceptual Capacities Workshop, The Australian National University, July 2011 (invited)

80. All Cognitive Content is Conscious Content
 - The Australian National University, Seminar, January 2011 (invited)
81. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
 - The University of Western Ontario, January 2010 (invited)
82. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
 - Washington University at St. Louis, January 2010 (invited)
83. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
 - The University of Waterloo, January 2010 (invited)
84. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
 - Cornell University, February 2010 (invited)
85. Comments on Pekka Väyrynen’s ‘Thick Concepts and Presupposition’
 - Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2010 (invited)
86. Comments on Chandra Sripada’s “The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action”
 - Moral Psychology Conference, Princeton University, November 2008 (invited)
87. The Varieties of Content
 - Philosophical Society, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, August 2008 (invited)
88. The Varieties of Content
 - Philosophical Society, Research School of Social Sciences, Philosophy Program, The Australian National University, August 2008 (invited)
89. Derived Mental Representation
 - Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2008 (refereed)
90. Does Intentional Content Supervene on Phenomenal Character?
 - Eighth Annual International Graduate Conference in Philosophy: Experience and Truth, University of Toronto, May 2008 (refereed)
91. Systematic Error About Color and What to Do About It
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, April 2008 (invited)
92. Derived Mental Representation and the Phenomenology of Thought
 - University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2008 (refereed)
93. Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem
 - Eleventh Annual Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, CUNY, March 2008 (refereed)

- 94. Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem
 - University of Minnesota Graduate Philosophy Conference, “Philosophy on Ice,” February 2008 (refereed)
- 95. Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, November 2007 (invited)

Teaching

2023–2024

- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2022–2023

- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2021–2022

- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2020–2021

- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (blended)
- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 9617A: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)

2017–2018

- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (blended)
- Philosophy 9617A: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)
- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind

2016–2017

- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (blended)

2015–2016

- Philosophy 4410F/9617A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind

2013–2014

- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
- Philosophy 4410G/9611A: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind
- Consciousness and Intentionality Prospectus Course (prospectus reading course)

2012–2013

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9661A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Propositional Attitudes Prospectus Course (graduate reading course)
- Panpsychism (graduate reading course)

2011–2012

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9605: Concepts (graduate/undergraduate seminar)

2010–2011

- Philosophy 2260F: Introduction to Philosophy of Language (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4991F/9407: Problems in Philosophy: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Foundations Seminar: Mental Representation (graduate seminar, ANU)
- Non-Veridical Representation (undergraduate reading course)

PhD supervision

1. Christopher Leeman (ongoing)
2. Yen-Tung Lee, *A Defense of Virtual Veridicalism* (co-supervising with David Bourget, ongoing)
3. Shawn Bartlett, *Intentionality and Experiencing Values* (completed 2023)
4. Stephen Pearce, *A Pure Representationalist Account of the Attitudes* (completed 2016)
5. Christopher Young, *Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact* (co-supervised with Andrew Botterell, 2015)

MA supervision

1. Saher Panjwani, *Empirical Work on the Combination Problem* (completed 2023)
2. Mingyan Yang, *On the Relation Between Cognitive Penetration and the Rich Content View* (completed 2023)
3. Jiafang (Jeff) He, *Reflections on Our Essence and Our Way of Persisting* (completed 2021)
4. Kyler Furlotte, *Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: Is Ontology Relevant?* (completed 2016)
5. Gregory Horne, *The Root of the Combination Problem for Panpsychism* (completed 2013)
6. Stephen Pearce, *Sense Modalities and Representationalism* (completed 2011)

PhD advising

1. Jessica du Toit, *What Do We Owe Animals in the Context of Health-Related Research?* (completed 2023)
2. Jaclyn Lanthier, *Understanding Epistemic Feelings via Interdisciplinary Corroboration* (prospective advisor, completed 2017)
3. Andrew Peterson, *Assessing Decision-Making Capacity After Severe Brain Injury* (completed 2016)
4. Nicolas McGinnis, *Reference and Experiment* (completed 2015)
5. O'Neal Buchanan, *Rethinking Empathy: Value and Context in Motivation and Adaptation* (completed 2015)
6. Matthew Ivanowich, *Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology* (completed 2015)
7. James Southworth, *William James' Theory of Emotion* (completed 2014)

PhD external advising

1. Connor D. Quinn, *Make Perception Phenomenology Again*, University of Texas at Austin (external advisor, completed 2023)
2. I-Sen Chen, *Converse Intentionalism and Experiential Content*, University of California—San Diego (external advisor, completed 2021)
3. Blaine Kenneally, *Intentionality from Structure: A Non-Relational Account of the Constitution of Phenomenal Intentionality*, University of Edinburgh (external advisor, completed 2019)

Awards

- Graham and Gale Wright Distinguished Scholar Award, Western University, 2021–2022
- Dean’s Travel Fund, Western University, 2010–2011, 2012–2013, 2015–2016, 2016–2017, 2017–2018, 2023–2024
- Faculty Research Development Fund, Western University, 2017–2018, 2018–2019
- Teaching Honour Roll, Western University, 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, 2014–2015, 2015–2016
- 2nd Place, Women’s Division, Princeton Outdoor Action Bouldering Competition, 2008

Service

- Graduate Program Chair, July 1, 2021–2023
- Appointments Committee, various years
- Chair of Visiting Speakers Committee, July 1, 2012–2014, 2020–June 30, 2021
- Graduate Admissions Committee, various years
- Chair of Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, 2017–2018
- Workload Committee, 2016–2017
- Mind and Language Area Chair, 2012–2014
- Canadian Philosophical Association Programme Committee, 2013–2014
- Co-chair of the Committee for Women’s Concerns, 2011–2013
- Visiting Speakers Committee, 2011–2012
- Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, 2010–2012

February 18, 2024