

Angela Mendelovici

Curriculum Vitae

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Employment

Current employment

- Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, The University of Western Ontario (UWO) (2018–ongoing)
- Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, UWO (2010–ongoing)
- Associate Member, Brain and Mind Institute, UWO (2014–ongoing)

Past employment

- Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, UWO (2010–2018)
- Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University (Jan. 2011–July 2011, Jan. 2012–July 2012)

Education

- Ph.D., Philosophy, Princeton University (2005–2010)
- B.A., Philosophy Honors (Minor in Psychology), McGill University (2001–2005)

Research areas

- Philosophy of mind (intentionality, consciousness, perception, concepts), philosophy of cognitive science

Publications and works in progress

Monograph

- Mendelovici, A. (2018). *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Oxford University Press.

Articles

- **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Olfactory experience, content, and justification. In Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia (eds.). *The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (forthcoming). Consciousness and intentionality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Immediate and reflective senses. In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado, and Dena Shottenkirk (eds.). *Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics*. Routledge.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). The combination problem is a problem for everyone. In William Seager (ed.). *Handbook for Panpsychism*. Routledge.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2018). Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). *Non-propositional Intentionality*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. *Disputatio* 8 (42):57–92.
- Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Phenomenal intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/>>
- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2014). Naturalizing intentionality: Tracking theories versus phenomenal intentionality theories. *Philosophy Compass* 9 (5):325–337.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Pure intentionalism about moods and emotions. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind*. Routledge, pp. 135–157.
- Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Tracking representationalism: Lycan, Dretske, and Tye. In Andrew Bailey (ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers*. Continuum, pp. 209–235.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Intentionalism about moods. *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1):126–136.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation (2013). *Philosophical Studies* 165 (2):421–443.
- Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P., **Mendelovici, A.**, McGeer, V., and Wheatley, T. (2011). Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 23 (10):3162–3180.

Book reviews

- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (forthcoming). Review of Karen Neander’s *A Mark of the Mental*. *Philosophical Review*.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Review of Dominic Gregory’s *Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and their Contents*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

- **Mendelovici A.** and Bourget, D. (2013). Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (eds.) *Cognitive Phenomenology*. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 91 (3):601–604.
- **Mendelovici A.** (2013). Review of Tim Bayne’s *The Unity of Consciousness*. *Philosophical Psychology* 26 (1):158–162.
- **Mendelovici A.** and Nielsen, K. (2012). Review of Steward Goetz and Charles Taliaferro’s *A Brief History of the Soul*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

Works in progress

- Reply to Philip Woodward’s “Primer, proposal, and paradigm: A review essay of Mendelovici’s *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*” for *Philosophical Psychology*
- Symposium paper on Karen Neander’s *A Mark of the Mental* for *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (co-authored with David Bourget)
- Grounding narrow content (invited contribution for symposium on Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne’s *Narrow Content* in *Inquiry*, co-authored with David Bourget)
- Propositional attitudes as self-ascriptions (in preparation for *Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker*, eds. Luis R. G. Oliveira and Kevin J. Corcoran, publisher TBA)
- Panpsychism and ignorance-based responses to the combination problem (in preparation for Title TBA, eds. Sam Coleman and Philip Goff, publisher TBA)
- Phenomenal intentionality and an internal theory of truth and reference
- Olfactory objects: Everyday objects and bare olfactory objects
- *Radical Internalism*

Other

- “A Sample Philosophy Paper” (2010). <http://prezi.com/z4h1_fwilbxj>
- “Amy Kind and Angela Mendelovici on representationalism about moods” (2013). Philosophy TV episode with Amy Kind. <<http://www.philostv.com/amy-kind-and-angela-mendelovici/>>

Presentations

Upcoming presentations

- “Original and derived intentionality in perception”
 - Winter Workshop in Philosophy of Perception, UC San Diego, February 2019
 - Session on Perception, Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, March 2019
- TBA
 - University of Notre Dame, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, April 2019
- “Phenomenal intentionality and truth and reference: An internal theory”

- Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality, St. Raffaele University, Milan, May 2019
- 14th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, Athens Institute for Education and Research, May 2019
- “The phenomenal basis of intentionality”
 - University of Turin, Department of Philosophy and Education Science, invited talk on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, May 2019
 - Phenomenal Intentionality (workshop based on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*), Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019
- “Phenomenal intentionality, thought, and cognitive phenomenology”
“Non-relational views of phenomenal intentionality and truth and reference to the mind-independent world”
 - Cognitive Phenomenology, Central European University Summer School, July 2019

Past presentations

- “Doing without external acquaintance”
 - Acquaintance and Direct Grasp, Institut Jean Nicod, July 2018
- “Mental combinations”
 - Russellian Monism: Time for the Details, Central European University, August 2017
 - Consciousness and Intentionality, University of Crete, Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, July 2017
- “The superficial character and deep nature of intentional states and contents”
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, June 2017
- “Fixing reference on intentionality and the mismatch problem”
“The phenomenal intentionality theory and self-ascriptivism”
 - Mind, Matter, and Consciousness, Central European University Summer School, July 2016
- “Phenomenal intentionality in thought”
 - Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network (SPAWN), Consciousness, 10th Anniversary Conference, July 2015 (upcoming)
 - Canadian Philosophical Association, Symposium of Intentionality, June 2013
- “Immediate and reflective senses”
 - Oakland University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2015
 - Victoria University at Wellington, Department of Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Invited Talk, May 2014
 - Keynote address for PhilMiLCog 2014, The University of Western Ontario, May 2014
- “Phenomenal intentionality and the derived content strategy” (with David Bourget)
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, Symposium on Phenomenal Intentionality, May 2014

- “Is the phenomenal intentionality theory naturalistic?” (with David Bourget)
 - Mardi Gras in Mind, Tulane University, February 2014
- “Intentionalism about moods”
 - 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, August 2013
- “Comments on David Bourget ‘Representationalism and perceptual distortion’”
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, June 2013
- “Mental representation is not a relation”
 - American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March 2013
 - University of Toronto, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2013
 - McMaster University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2013
- “How concepts get their contents”
 - University of Wisconsin–Madison, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, February 2013
 - Yeshiva University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, February 2013
- “The derived content view” (with David Bourget)
 - Interfaces of the Mind, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, July 2012
 - Intentionality and Phenomenality Conference, Crete, June 2012
- “The role of phenomenal consciousness in thought”
 - University of Melbourne, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2012
 - Mind and Consciousness Conference, The University of Western Australia, February 2012
 - Hong Kong University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, January 2012
- “The conscious experience of pain”
 - Wellesley College, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, November 2011
- “Intentionalism about emotions”
 - Wayne State University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Oct. 2011
 - Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2011
 - Charles Sturt University at Wagga Wagga, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, July 2011
 - ANU Women’s Work-in-Progress Seminar, May 2011
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, Sept. 2009
- “Phenomenal intentionality meets conceptual atomism”
 - European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Milan, Sept. 2011
- “Do phenomenal characters compose?”
 - Consciousness at the Beach, The Australian National University, July 2011
- “Perceptual subcapacities: Tracking and representation”
 - Perceptual Capacities Workshop, The Australian National University, July 2011

- “All cognitive content is conscious content”
 - The Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences, Philosophy Program, Invited Talk, Jan. 2011
- “A moderate position on the phenomenology of thought”
 - The University of Western Ontario, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - Washington University at St. Louis, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - The University of Waterloo, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - Cornell University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Feb. 2010
- “Comments on Pekka Väyrynen’s ‘Thick concepts and presupposition’”
 - Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Aug. 2010
- “Comments on Chandra Sripada’s ‘The deep self model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action’”
 - Moral Psychology Conference, Princeton University, Nov. 2008
- “The varieties of content”
 - Philosophical Society, Research School of Social Sciences, Philosophy Program, The Australian National University, Aug. 2008
- “Derived mental representation”
 - Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2008
- “Does intentional content supervene on phenomenal character?”
 - Eighth Annual International Graduate Conference in Philosophy, “Experience and Truth,” University of Toronto, May 2008
- “Systematic error about color and what to do about it”
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, April 2008
- “Derived mental representation and the phenomenology of thought”
 - University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2008
- “Causal theories of mental representation and the mismatch problem”
 - Eleventh Annual Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, CUNY, March 2008
 - University of Minnesota Graduate Philosophy Conference, “Philosophy on Ice,” Feb. 2008
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, Nov. 2007

Teaching

2017–2018

- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (blended)
- Philosophy 9617A: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)
- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind

2016–2017

- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (online)
- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (blended)

2015–2016

- Philosophy 4410F/9617A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind

2013–2014

- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
- Philosophy 4410G/9611A: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind
- Consciousness and Intentionality Prospectus Course (prospectus reading course)

2012–2013

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9661A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Propositional Attitudes Prospectus Course (graduate reading course)
- Panpsychism (graduate reading course)

2011–2012

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9605: Concepts (graduate/undergraduate seminar)

2010–2011

- Philosophy 2260F: Introduction to Philosophy of Language (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4991F/9407: Problems in Philosophy: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Foundations Seminar: Mental Representation (graduate seminar, ANU)
- Non-Veridical Representation (undergraduate reading course)

Graduate supervision (PhD and MA)

- Shawn Bartlett, on representationalism and evaluative states (PhD supervisor, ongoing)
- Peter Verveniotis, on linguistic representation and phenomenal intentionality (PhD joint-supervisor, ongoing)

- Kyler Furlotte, *Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: Is Ontology Relevant?* (MA supervisor, completed 2016)
- Stephen Pearce, *A Pure Representationalist Account of the Attitudes* (PhD supervisor, completed 2016)
- Christopher Young, *Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact* (PhD joint-supervisor, completed 2015)
- Gregory Horne, *The Root of the Combination Problem for Panpsychism* (MA supervisor, completed 2013)
- Stephen Pearce, *Sense Modalities and Representationalism* (MA supervisor, completed 2011)

Graduate advising (PhD)

- Andrew Peterson, *Assessing Decision-Making Capacity After Severe Brain Injury* (completed 2016)
- Nicolas McGinnis, *Reference and Experiment* (completed 2015)
- O’Neal Buchanan, *Rethinking Empathy: Value and Context in Motivation and Adaptation* (completed 2015)
- Matthew Ivanowich, *Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology* (completed 2015)
- James Southworth, *William James Theory of Emotion* (completed 2014)

Awards

- Dean’s Travel Fund, UWO, 2010–2011, 2012–2013, 2015–2016, 2016–2017, 2017–2018
- Teaching Honour Roll, UWO, 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, 2014–2015, 2015–2016

Service

- Graduate Admissions Committee, UWO, 2016–17, 2017–2018
- Chair of Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, UWO, 2017–2018
- Appointments Committee, UWO, 2012–2013, 2016–2017
- Workload Committee, UWO, 2016–2017
- Language and Mind Area Chair, UWO, 2012–2014
- Chair of Visiting Speakers’ Committee, UWO, 2013–2014
- Canadian Philosophical Association Programme Committee, 2013–2014
- Co-chair of the Committee for Women’s Concerns, UWO, 2011–2013

- Visiting Speakers Committee, UWO, 2011–2012
- Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, UWO, 2010–2012

December 13, 2018