Chapter 2: “Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez”

Author: Roger Ariew (University of South Florida)

Taking two Suárezian doctrines in which Suárez aligns himself with neither Thomas nor Scotus, one can detect both his influence and the limitations of that influence in Descartes and Leibniz. The second paper discusses the relation between Suárez’s theory of distinctions and Descartes’ philosophy and then his principle of individuation and Leibniz’s views.

Suárez argues for a third distinction between real and of reason, that is, a modal distinction, as opposed to the Scotist formal distinction. And for Suárez, like Descartes, two-way separability is a sign of a real distinction of a thing from another thing; one-way separability is a sign of a modal distinction of a thing from its mode; and mutual inseparability is a sign of a distinction of reason of a thing conceived in some way from the same thing conceived in a different way. Was Descartes a reader of Suárez on the theory of distinctions? It seems plausible to presume so, though the paper concludes that if he read him, it was after he had written the Meditations, at the end of 1640, beginning of 1641.

With Leibniz we have a different kind of reader. Leibniz wrote a Bachelor’s thesis in 1663 in which he affirmed Thomasius’ position that the principle of individuation is the Suárezian whole entity—not just the substantial form. By 1668 he wrote a tract on the Eucharist in which he defended for himself (and his employer) the position that the principle of individuation is the substantial form, something less than the whole entity. With a few significant modifications, the Scotist position is the one Leibniz kept in his mature philosophy.

Leibniz and Descartes were both greatly influenced by the currents of late scholastic metaphysics, especially by the metaphysics of the great Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez, though each in his own fashion.

Chapter 3: “Shadows of Being: Francisco Suárez’s Entia Rationis”

Author: Christopher Shields (Oxford University)

Francisco Suárez devotes the last of his fifty-four Metaphysical Disputations (DM) to beings of reason (entia rationis), those troublesome creatures which flummox us by their unstable existential demands: when we say that the griffin does not exist, we are met straightaway with the question of what we are talking about when we so speak. Although a fair bit of what he says seems at least initially to suggest a Meinongean solution to the problem of non-existent beings, Suárez’s treatment of beings of reason in fact proves both more difficult to classify and also far more nuanced than so much would suggest. Ultimately, Suárez seeks to treat an ens rationis as a non-existent subject of an existing extrinsic denomination, or, more precisely, as that to which an extrinsic denomination would attach if there were something really existing as a subject for that extrinsic denomination. On this approach, which we may term the tethered counterfactual approach—tethered because entia rationis are perforce tied to acts of
intellection and counterfactual because these acts treat them as if they existed though they do not—entia rationis, despite their non-existence, may be implicated in the causal nexus.

Chapter 4: Suarez on Continuous Quantity

Author: Jorge Secada (University of Virginia)

The paper expounds Suarez’s Aristotelian account of quantity, showing how he straddles between a pre-modern (ie pre-Cartesian) conception of quantity as a form of material substances, and as intrinsically involving qualitative elements, and a modern mathematical conception of body. The paper focuses on his treatment of continuity to bring into clear focus Suarez’s connections to both Descartes and his followers, and to the prior Aristotelian tradition. One theme running through the paper is the relation between conceptual continuity and discontinuity in intellectual history, and in particular in the history of philosophy.

Chapter 5: “Suárez on Propinquity and the Efficient Cause”

Author: Dennis Des Chene (Washington University at St. Louis)

The theory of the efficient cause in late Aristotelianism includes what can be called various “formal characters”. These are features of the causal relation that can be defined independently of claims about the nature of causality, e.g. whether or not it involves a “necessary connection” between cause and effect.

Among the formal characters standardly treated in disputations on the efficient cause is that of whether the cause must be “propinquitous” to the effect. If not, then actio in distans is possible. Suárez, in agreement with Aquinas and his followers, and contrary to Scotus and his followers, holds that action at a distance is impossible. The interest in his discussion lies in not so much in the position he takes as in his account of how causes act on things remote from them—that is, of how causes act through media. The issue is of interest not only in its own right but because Descartes’ reduction of physical interaction to collision may have been motivated in part by his realization that the troublesome issues one sees Suárez grappling with disappear if all action is by way of immediate impact.

Chapter 6: “The Causal Role of Substantial Forms in Suárez”

Author: Helen Hattab (University of Houston)

In Metaphysical Disputation 15, entitled “On the Formal Cause of Substance”, Suárez characterizes both matter and form as incomplete substances which, by their union, constitute a complete substance. Setting himself against Aquinas, among others, he thereby denies that the form of a substance is the formal cause of the being of its matter. Rather the substantial form serves only as the formal cause of the matter/form composite. In this manner, Suárez severely
curtails the causal/explanatory role that substantial forms traditionally played in Scholastic Aristotelian metaphysics of substance. This paper will argue that Suárez instead places greater emphasis on the causal/explanatory role that substantial forms played in natural philosophy. It will focus primarily on his a posteriori arguments for the existence of substantial forms in Disputation 15 and his discussion of the causal efficacy of accidents in Disputation 18. It will conclude by considering the arguments that some anti-Aristotelians writing after the publication of Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations deployed against the substantial form. The goal is to examine the extent to which Suárez’s emphasis on natural philosophical concerns and empirical arguments for substantial forms shifted the terms of the debate about the existence of substantial forms.

Chapter 7: “Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul’s Dependence on the Body”

Author: James South (Marquette University)

This paper provides a close reading of Suárez’s two significant arguments for the immortality of the soul present in his early commentary on the De Anima. It shows that he is cognizant of a metaphysical argument for immortality, which he inherits from Aquinas. While he states that this argument is sufficient, he nonetheless devotes most of his discussion to another argument, which seems designed to shore up a perceived, and crucial, weakness present in the metaphysical argument. This second argument relies on an account of the soul’s dependence on the body that is decidedly non-thomistic. In providing a reading of his argument, the paper notes that the premises are set forth in language borrowed from the 16th century Italian philosopher Pietro Pomponazzi and that what is at stake is providing an understanding of three crucial passages in Aristotle’s De Anima. These three passages are especially problematic in that they suggest a dependence of the soul on the body that would call into question the strength of the metaphysical argument. In tracing out Suárez’s subtle account of the varying senses of “dependence,” the paper shows that the commitment he has to a certain view of the soul’s dependence on body underwrites several other non-thomistic elements of his account of human cognition. In conclusion, the paper also notes the importance of recognizing that Suárez’s philosophical thought is shaped by currents of thought prevalent in the 15th and 16th centuries.

Chapter 8: “Suárez on Mind-Body Interaction”

Author: Cees Leijenhorst (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)

In his natural philosophy, as found in the Disputationes, Suárez develops a notion of body that runs counter to the Thomistic tradition. With the help of the concept of “forma corporeitatis”, Suárez develops the concept of body into much more than just an incomplete substance. Though Suárez maintains the hylomorphic vocabulary, his notion of body almost explodes the hylomorphic framework in ways that seem to foreshadow Descartes. Moreover, in his De Anima, Suárez seems to flirt with a mind-body dualism that has a certain Cartesian ring to it. This paper explores Suárez notion of body, more in particular of the human body and its interaction with the mind.
Chapter 9: “Unity and Multiplicity in Súarez’s Soul”
Author: Marleen Rozemond (University of Toronto)

Historically many philosophers have seen the human soul as the simple subject of mental operations and defended the simplicity of the soul or mind on the basis of the unity of consciousness. Suárez’s conception of the human soul was importantly different. First, while he held that the soul in itself is unitary, he thought it is the subject of a multiplicity of really distinct faculties. At the same time, he wished to account for the connections between mental contents that pertain to these different faculties, and he did so by appealing to the fact that they belong to the unitary soul. Another important difference is that for Súarez the soul is not just the principle of the mental, but the principle of life. Thus he often presented the connections between the faculties and their unity in the same soul as characteristic of life rather than of the mental. This paper examines how Suárez uses the idea of the unitary soul to explain the connections between the activities of its really distinct faculties and how his conceptions of the mental and life play a role in this solution.

Chapter 10: “Reason and Obligation in Suárez”
Author: Thomas Pink (King’s College London)

The paper discusses Suárez’s conception of obligation in the context both of his general theory of reason and rationality, of his theory of action, and of his theory of law in its various forms. Obligation, for Suárez, is a kind of directive standard on action - it directs and demands that we do what is right and avoid doing what is wrong. But how does this directive arise, in what does it consist, and how does it address and possess authority over how we act? The paper explores how at a fundamental level Suárez seeks to understand the directive authority of obligation in exactly the same terms as other late scholastics - in terms of a distinctive justificatory force or vis directiva of obligation. At the same time, more controversially, and in opposition to many other late scholastics, Suárez sought to understand the directive authority of obligation in terms of a hierarchy of legal superiority and subordination. The paper will also discuss Suárez’s theory of the distinction between obligations under natural law and obligations under positive law - and the peculiar difficulties that his theory faced in making sense of canon law. For in canon law we find a form of positive law that seems directly to address internal motivations as well as external actions, and in this respect operates as does natural law; but which like civil law is imposed and enforced by human authorities and tribunals that, like all such, directly address and monitor our external actions. Suárez’s theory of obligation is shown to be closely tied to a complex theory both of the constitution of human agency and of our epistemic access to the actions of our humans.

Chapter 11: “Suárez and Natural Law”
Author: James Gordley (Tulane University)
In his account of natural law, and in metaphysics, Suárez differed from Aquinas in ways that led some critics to claim that his account of natural law is “minimalist” and “negative,” and others to object that his metaphysics is “essentialist.” The changes are related. Suárez’s metaphysics enabled him to explain natural law differently than Aquinas. By understanding that relationship, we can see how Suárez became vulnerable to both sets of critics. Nevertheless, although the change in metaphysics was original to Suárez, his approach to natural law had been anticipated, in part, by some of his contemporaries. That account may have become plausible, not because of a change in metaphysics, but because of changing expectations about the sort of rules that comprise the natural law.