The
Rump Parliament of Modern Academic Philosophy
By
Doug Mann
1.
The Problem Delineated
The
way that philosophy is defined in the contemporary English-speaking academy
shows the results of a lengthy process of the systematic shaving off of the
discipline into narrower and narrower fields of study, largely under the
tutelage of twentieth-century analytic philosophy.[1]
Bertrand
Russell actually gives an early account of this process from a benign
perspective in his 1912 book The Problems of Philosophy: once a subfield
becomes a science, it leaves philosophy behind, with psychology being the most
famous case in point of how a field of philosophy becomes a science. I will
argue that Russell’s “sciencization” hypothesis is
explicitly ideological, and simply doesn’t cover all meaningful cases of the
shaving off of philosophy. Instead, the proper way of understanding the history
of this fragmentation is by using a political model, by comparing it to the way
that a dominant faction in a revolutionary state systematically purges its
enemies in order to both protect itself and to exert its control over the
nation.
English-language
academic philosophy is now in a post-purge period of its development, ruled
over not by the iron fist of a Cromwell or the national razor of the Jacobins,
but by the velvet glove of a mass of analytic philosophers committed to a view
of philosophy as a mere shadow of what it once was, a shadow that emphasizes
links to physical science and the logical analysis of philosophical language.
This shadow was not created by a series of logical debates aiming at “truth,”
but by a train of ideological and political struggles aiming at power.
2.
Mapping a Discipline
Before moving on to my political model, let’s look at how analytic philosophers themselves map their discipline. An astonishingly clear picture of this map is provided by Ted Honderich in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995), which he edited. In the Appendix to this mini-encyclopaedia Honderich maps the various fields of philosophy as a sort of solar system (see the diagram below).
Diagram One: Honderich’s Map of the Philosophical Solar System
At
the fiery center of this solar system we find exactly what we would expect from
an analytic philosopher: epistemology, logic, and metaphysics. In the first orbit we find fields allied to
the former, namely the philosophies of language, science, and mind, along with
moral philosophy. At the solar system’s outer edge, in the darker regions of
academic space, we find the fields that Honderich
feels are peripheral to the core interests of philosophy: social and political
philosophy, the philosophies of history and law, aesthetics, the philosophies
of education, religion, and mathematics.
Although
admitting that many different maps of philosophy are possible, he justifies his
own map with the odd remark that as we move away from the core area, the other
items tend to be less general, and to be dependent on these core items, while
the core items are not dependent on the peripheries. He concludes that for
these reasons “philosophers have given more attention to the more central
items, so that the diagram also to some extent maps popularity” (p. 928). The
obvious question here is, popularity according to
whom?
Epistemology,
logic and metaphysics are just as dependent on questions of moral, political,
and aesthetic values as the reverse. Firstly, they all take place in
institutions maintained either by the state or by some private interests, and
thus are associated with economic and political values; second, researchers’
choices of which area of research to pursue are also governed by moral and
aesthetic values; third, the sense of the rightness of a solution to a problem
in these areas is as often a reflection of feelings of its goodness or beauty
as its logical or empirical truth. If it weren’t, then there would be a body of
epistemological and metaphysical problems that would have been settled, once
and for all, just as science has given us a series of physical laws that, with
some qualifications, are accepted as true beyond doubt. Yet there are few such
firm conclusions in these fields of philosophy.
And
most fundamentally, we have to ask Honderich and
like-minded thinkers, why is moral philosophy (along with the social and
political philosophies which Honderich sees as its
offshoots) dependent on logic and epistemology, and therefore less fundamental,
than the core areas? This has certainly not been accepted by the majority of
important thinkers in the history of philosophy - many have produced quite coherent
discussions of moral philosophy with little if any reference to these “core
disciplines” (at least directly, in the works where they intend to focus on
morals and politics). Quite the opposite - important thinkers such as Socrates,
Plato, Hobbes, Hume, Mill, Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre, just to mention a few,
seemed to have thought that Honderich’s core fields
are mere propaedeutics to more important moral,
political and aesthetic questions. In short, values zoom in and out of the core
of this solar system like so many errant comets, putting into question the
accuracy of his cosmic map.
A
good test of the arbitrary nature of Hoderich’s map
of the discipline is a visit to the beginnings of the analytic/Continental
split in the eighteenth century. A core thinker here was David Hume. His core
text is, of course, A Treatise of Human Nature, which despite falling
dead born from the presses, presents in its own way a superb map of philosophy
as seen by an early modern empiricist. Hume was no obscure Heidegger or wooly-headed Foucault, but a sound and sober Scot who
believed as earnestly as Ayer in the elimination of philosophical confusions
through the use of good arguments.
For
Hume, the telos of philosophical speculation was
certainly not logic. His one discussion of logic in the Treatise comes
on p. 175 of the Selby-Bigge edition, during a
treatment of causality. In it he ridicules the “scholastic headpieces and
logicians” for showing no superiority over the “vulgar” in their ability to
reason, which gives Hume the determination to avoid “long systems of rules and
precepts”, turning to the “natural principles” of the understanding instead.
Nor
was his central concern epistemology and “hard” metaphysics in isolation,
though these certainly interested him (admittedly, the “soft” metaphysics
surrounding the philosophy of religion occupied his thoughts to a great
degree). Instead it was human nature, whose study he saw as a moral
science. He makes this crystal clear in the Introduction to the Treatise, where
he says that “all sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature”
(p. xix), including mathematics and physical science.
The
organization of the book also makes his interest in morals clear. Book I tries
to clear away some epistemological and metaphysical confusions, though even
Hume himself admits not entirely successfully - it ends with a sceptical
concluding section in which he fancies himself a “strange uncouth monster” (p.
264) expelled from all human commerce. He engages in some existential angst
while walking alone the river, then decides that a glass of wine and a game of
backgammon with friends, and not another dose of epistemology, will cure this
angst. Book II is on the psychology of the passions; Book III on moral
philosophy, or what we would call today ethics and political theory, with a few
other things mixed in. This organization is no accident - the Scottish
Enlightenment as a whole saw moral philosophy, and the social life it studied,
as the central preoccupation of philosophy. And to understand social life it
engaged in a diverse series of inquiries that encompassed fields that we would
call today philosophy, history, political science, psychology, sociology,
literary criticism, and economics. In fact, an argument could be made that the
last three fields owe their existence to the explorations of the Scots - Adam
3.
A Historical Analogy: The English and French Revolutions
In
most major revolutions, from the English Civil War of the 1640s to the Russian
Revolution of 1917 to the decline and fall of the Soviet empire, a central
party (or leader) has systematically eliminated opposition groups that it sees
as threatening its power. I take my basic metaphor from the English Civil War
of the 1640s, specifically, from the purge of December 6, 1648 when Colonel
Pride barred or arrested members of the House of Commons who opposed the trial
of King Charles II. Pride’s Purge took place under the orders of Oliver Cromwell, head of the New Model Army and of the Puritan
faction in
Yet
perhaps the classic case of this process is the series of purges in the
National Convention of the
Other
cases come to mind - the struggle for power in 1917-1920 in the post-revolution
Soviet Union between Lenin’s Bolsheviks and their rivals; Stalin’s purges in
the 1920s and 1930; and even the post-1989 politics in some countries in the
former Soviet Empire (Vladimir Putin’s recent manoeuvrings come to mind). In
all cases a strong leader or party systematically eliminated its opponents to
achieve, at least for a time, its political hegemony.
4.
An Outline of the Rump Parliament
The
core of philosophy at present is epistemology, logic and what I shall call
“good” metaphysics, which includes things like the mind/body question and
cognitive science. Allied to these issues is a strong regard for the philosophy
of physical science. These concerns represent the hard rump of the modern
parliament of philosophy, and are pictured in the diagram below as its right
wing.
At
the border of this rump, in the center of the parliament, we find ethics,
applied ethics, social and political philosophy, and “bad” metaphysics i.e. the
philosophy of religion and speculations about the nature of reality as a whole.
These are usually represented in at least a middling way in Philosophy
departments, but for the most part in a spirit that assimilates them to the
concerns and methods of the analytic rump. For example, an analytic philosopher
will typically divide a 12-week Introduction to Philosophy course up in
something like the following manner: 2 weeks on basic logic, 3 weeks on “hard”
metaphysics, 5 on epistemology, and 2 weeks on ethics (with political
philosophy being assimilated to ethics, and aesthetics, the philosophy of
culture, and Continental thought totally ignored).[2]
On
the left side of the old parliament of philosophy, but largely excluded from
the rump, are aesthetics, the philosophy of history, and existentialism and
phenomenology, which are represented in rumpish
philosophy departments in a token fashion, if at all (despite the popularity of
existentialism with students, if it is presented in a coherent and sympathetic
fashion by instructors).
At
the left end of the old parliament are a series of subsidiary theoretical
interests largely foreign to the rump which are
usually totally excluded from it. These include communications theory and
cultural studies, post-structuralism, postmodernism, and the social theory that
comes out of these fields of study. It might also include psychology proper,
although in this case we can assume that Russell is right that its exclusion is
based on its having achieved some sort of “scientific” status.
Diagram Two: The
Parliament of Philosophy
[right wing] [left wing]
The
domination of this logical-epistemological rump is by no means the result of
some process of natural academic selection or of a universal agreement that the
areas of study excluded from it are entirely unworthy of study. Instead, it is
the result of a series of unique historical and political events in academic
life, allied to a series of basic presuppositions and prejudices on the part of
analytic philosophy. Specifically, it is the result of an implicit decision in
much of the Anglo-American world that what I shall all “engaged” philosophy -
political and social theory, aesthetics, the philosophy of history,
existentialism, cultural studies, communications theory, and postmodernism -
should not be the central concern of philosophical speculation (or in many
cases of any concern at all). This is a grand historical mistake, for in all cases
these fields of study migrated from a hostile philosophical environment to more
friendly environments in Political Science, Sociology, English, Communications,
and other departments. The migration has served only to impoverish philosophy.
A
number of interesting historical facts come to mind here. Social theory is full
of thinkers who were either literally philosophers or who had strong
philosophical backgrounds. All of the Enlightenment and its offspring fits in here - Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, the Marquis de
Condorcet and Auguste Comte. Marx was a philosopher,
amongst other things. George Herbert Mead, one of the most famous early twentieth-century
American social theorists, was a philosopher by education. The school he helped to found, the
This
is especially surprising in the cases of cultural studies and communications
theory, which until recently had no home turf in academe (though communications
programs are proliferating as we speak). The influence of technology and media
on our values, our perceptions and our lives is a fundamentally philosophical
question, as theorists like Marshall McLuhan made all too clear. These are
basic moral and epistemological issues, not just matters for empirical social
research.
5.
Some Statistics
In
this section I will analyse ten representative Canadian universities to show
how the teaching and research areas of full-time faculty there empirically
prove that a “rump parliament” now dominates academic philosophy departments in
this country. I will distinguish here the “hard rump” - the area of the
philosophical parliament in Diagram 2 extending from metaphysics to logic - from
the larger “soft rump” – which is the hard rump plus ethics.
Methodology: I chose ten representative universities from across the country,
excluding the
In general, I counted the first two specializations
listed for each professor as the dominant ones in the absence of evidence to
the contrary. In some cases two listed specializations are so similar that I
combined them, including whatever else is listed as their “second”
specialization. In cases where the main focus of a given specialization was
unclear, I looked at publication titles, courses taught and the other
specializations listed. In cases where only one specialization is listed, I
simply counted it twice.
I only counted full-time (tenure or tenure-track)
professors, excluding instructors/adjuncts/graduate students, whose long-term
influence and position in the power structure of philosophy departments is
minimal (though they may influence their undergraduate students through their
teaching quite heavily). I also excluded retired professors. The total
specializations in a department (T) = the number of full-time professors with
declared specializations (P) x 2.
The “hard” philosophical rump of specializations
includes logic, epistemology,
philosophy of language, cognitive science/analytic philosophy of
mind, the philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy in cases where
the dominant focus seemed to be logic, epistemology or “hard” metaphysics. The
soft rump includes all of the above plus ethics of all types since in most
cases ethicists take an analytic approach to their work. To balance the few
cases where they don’t, I included a number of vague “history of philosophy”
specializations in a neutral category, including all listings of ancient
philosophy, even though a substantial proportion of these historians of
philosophy do, in fact, take an analytic approach indistinguishable from that
of the “hard” rump. I also considered political and social philosophers as
outside the soft rump despite the fact that many of them take an analytical or
logical approach to their work, and are thus allied to the hard rump parliament
of philosophy.
University |
Total of FT
Professors[3] |
Number of
Specializations in Hard Rump |
% of those in
Department |
Number of
Specializations in Soft Rump |
% of those in
Department |
UBC |
16 |
25 |
78% |
27 |
84% |
|
21 |
22 |
54% |
32 |
76% |
|
15 |
15 |
50% |
21 |
70% |
|
12 |
12 |
50% |
17 |
71% |
Western |
32 |
39 |
61% |
51 |
80% |
|
12 |
17 |
71% |
20 |
83% |
Queen’s |
19 |
18 |
47% |
28 |
74% |
|
22 |
22 |
50% |
27 |
61% |
McGill |
22 |
21 |
48% |
27 |
61% |
Dalhousie |
13 |
16 |
61% |
25 |
96% |
TOTALS |
184 |
207 |
56% |
275 |
75% |
Totals of Declared
Specialisations
The Hard Rump
Parliament of Philosophy
Logic
(includes Critical Thinking, Philosophy of Mathematics, Decision Theory)=36
Epistemology/Philosophy
of Language=34
Cognitive
Science/Philosophy of Mind/Analytic Metaphysics=41
Philosophy
of Science (all types)=67
“Hard”
History of Philosophy (focus on logical, epistemology, analytics)=26
The Soft Rump
Parliament
Ethics
(all types)=43
Applied
Ethics (includes Bioethics, Environmental Ethics, Business Ethics)=26
Largely Neutral
Specializations
“Neutral”
History of Philosophy (e.g. ancient)=20
“Soft”
History of Philosophy (i.e. non-analytic)=6
“Soft”
Metaphysics (including Philosophy of Religion, Idealism)=4
Engaged Philosophy
Social
and Political Philosophy (includes Philosophy of Law)=38
Existentialism
& Phenomenology (19th and 20th century continental
thought)=12
Postmodernism
& Post-structuralism=3
Aesthetics/Philosophy
of Art=5
Philosophy
of History=1
Social
Theory=1
Communications
or Cultural Theory=0
A
Summary of the Canadian Parliament of Philosophy (totals for all ten
schools)
Hard
Rump Parliament (logic, epistemology, mind, science): 207 (56%)
Soft
Rump Parliament (add ethics and applied ethics to hard rump): 275 (75%)
Specializations
Outside the Rump (neutral and “engaged” philosophy): 93
(25%)
Analysis:
We
can categorize these ten universities into three groups. First comes the three
“hardcore” analytic schools: UBC,
Next comes four “softcore”
universities where about half the specializations are in the hard rump, with
the soft rump comprising 70-76% in each case: the Universities of Alberta,
There are two partial anomalies to the general rule
that the rump parliament dominates philosophy in
Finally, a few words about how specific
specializations are distributed. The philosophy of science dominates the ten Canadian
departments studied, with 67 specializations. Although ethics comes second with
43 specializations, the next three subfields are all from the hard rump:
analytic metaphysics (41), logic (36) and epistemology (34). Honderich’s idealized “solar system” as a political model
for hiring and promotion in philosophy departments seems to be confirmed by
these statistics. Further, there are only fifteen specializations total for
continental thought of all brands, with four schools not listing a single
full-time professor with a continental philosophy primary specialization.
Statistically, this equates to 0.75 continentalists
per department. This is very strange, given the tremendous influence thinkers
such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, Habermas,
Baudrillard, Derrida and Foucault have had on modern
thought and culture. Lastly, there is only one social theorist and one
philosopher of history, and no philosophers of culture or communication, in
these ten departments.
6. The Anatomy of Philosophical Revolutions
Why did this revolution happen? I suggest a number of causal explanations:
(1) The dominance of modern science in modern bureaucracies and the culture at large, bringing with it an emphasis on empirical experimentation as the ground of all valid knowledge, hence positivism. This lead to a long-term legitimation crisis for academic philosophy: how could the discipline of Plato, Descartes, Hume and Nietzsche win the favour of natural scientists?
(2) This is paralleled
by the bureaucratization of philosophy in large academic institutions that are
either privately funded, as in the
(3) A third likely
cause is an over-emphasis within philosophy of the power of logical and
linguistic analysis to solve important philosophical problems, which was tied
to a sense of national or institutional pride associated in
The final result of
these paradigmatic revolutions is the political hegemony of the analytic rump
parliament in Canadian (and no doubt American and British) philosophy
departments.
7. The Grand Historical Mistake of Modern Philosophy
The grand historical mistake made by modern academic
philosophy is the abandonment of engaged philosophy (broadly conceived) to
other academic disciplines: of parts of political theory to political science,
of social theory to sociology, the philosophy of history to history, of
cultural studies and communications theory to communications, English, and
other programs, and the marginalization of existentialism and modern
Continental philosophy in limited course and research ghettos, if not its total
exclusion (with literature and media studies programs taking up some of the
slack). Added to this is the placement in the intellectual attic of once
moderately important fields of study such as aesthetics, which hasn’t really
been adopted by another academic discipline (though fine arts may occasionally
offer a course in the field). None of this was inevitable - it was the result
of a series of paradigm-defining political decisions by analytic philosophers
who came to define the content of academic philosophy in the twentieth century.
Ironically,
by the 1970s and 1980s, this resulted in criticism in some quarters that
academic philosophy had lost its social relevance. Normally, this wouldn’t
matter to logicians and epistemologists lost in their abstruse speculations.
Yet when student populations and sources of funds started to drop off in the
1980s and 1990s (after all, it’s a notorious fact that administrations always
cut arts programs first when trimming university budgets under pressure from
government cuts), academic philosophers saw their empires crumbling. So they
took what was at hand - logic and largely rationalist ethics - and tried to
“apply” them to social issues. Hence was born critical thinking, business ethics,
ethics for accountants, bio-ethics, and other
“service” courses that in some cases dominate a Philosophy department’s
relation to the student population around it, at least in terms of sheer
numbers. The question whether these courses are successful in
accomplishing their goals - naturally, I am sceptical about this - I leave to
another day. Yet it seems clear that the circumstances of their birth
had a lot to do with putting some bums in the empty seats vacated by students
who no longer saw philosophy as relevant.
Is
it too late to reclaim engaged philosophy for the discipline? I’m not sure,
though bureaucratic institutions, as any student of Max Weber knows, tend to
fight for their territories tooth and nail, rarely agreeing to give up an
administrative province to a rival without some sort of concrete political and
economic pressure. Added to this is the fact that most current academic
philosophers who run Philosophy departments don’t want these lost provinces
back anyway, being proud of their splendid isolation from engaged philosophy.
Yet there are no inevitabilities in the history of ideas. Surprising things
sometimes do happen - to return to my political metaphor, ancien
regimes collapse, Cold Wars end, kings are
guillotined. If they do, then it will be not the worst of times, but the best
of times, a spring of hope after a winter of despair (with a tip of the hat to
Mr. Dickens).
Bibliography
Honderich, Ted ed. The
Hume,
David. A Treatise of
Human Nature. Ed. L. A.
Selby-Bigge.
Russell,
Betrand. The Problems of Philsophy.
University websites for UBC,
[1] I
base most of my conclusions on data from Canadian universities, though my sense
is that this critique would also apply to American and British schools.
[2] This is based on an actual outline whose author will remain nameless.
[3] This involves all those with declared specializations. The total number of specializations is twice the listed number of professors.