Formed amidst scandal and worry about the state of ethics, about misuse and abuse of office in Canada's largest city and civic administration, the creation of the Toronto Integrity Commissioner is an interesting development within Canadian government ethics law and within local public administration. This office represents a sense that the current ethics regime at the local level generally and in Toronto in particular has been inadequate and that it can be enhanced by some sort of monitoring and advisory mechanism. While the current Toronto model is a mechanism limited by law and by the timidity of its creators, it is a change and one which merits consideration in appreciating and appraising ethics law "enforcement" in Canada. That there is a need for such an institution and that it's role and powers should be expanded has been affirmed recently by Madam Justice Bellamy in her report from the Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry. This affirmation and her recommendations also bear serious analysis.

A view of current law and of the Toronto model reveals many of the tensions and debates which have informed ethics law and practice for many years. The values versus rules debate is apparent as is the debate over whether to have ombudsman like entities or tribunals. As well the movement from conflict of interest focused ethics systems to broad integrity focused systems is manifest. Further the debate over whether or not the new public management will give way to the new public service is also evident. These discussions, these debates and tensions are constantly in play if not always obvious. It is the theses of this paper and this writer's work on ethics in government generally that values of integrity and fairness must inform government action, that values statements and training while necessary are not sufficient for ensuring ethical behaviour, that rules and rule enforcement are important tools in ethical conduct in government, and that ethics reform in government requires a transformation from the results oriented business approach of the new public management to a process respecting, results concerned, socially responsible new public service.

Public Service, Democracy and Ethics

Any consideration of ethics regimes in the public sector should start with an analysis of service because it is through an understanding of service and its place in social life and in governance that the ethics of governance is situated. Service is both an ideal and a practice. As an ideal, religious and philosophical, service is, to follow Ghandi, about putting others before self. Service is an acknowledgement of our sociality and an ideal which implies that giving is central to who we are as human and humane beings. Service as the Quakers and others religious would have us understand is the quintessence of our humanity and among its highest goals. Service is a calling, a constant calling, of a voice within each of us to act outside of ourselves for others.

Service of course is a practice and public service is a particular form of that practice. That it has its own characteristics and problems is attested to by countless public administration texts.

Let me suggest some simple propositions upon which much of my thinking rests and I submit upon which much of government Canadian ethics law rests.

Public service matters. Public service and administration provides necessary services and goods for our society.

Public service occurs within a democratic system.

As Greene and Shugarman indicate in their book Honest Politics democracy incorporates key values concerning equity and mutual respect. It entails the governed behaving responsibly to those they govern and it demands accountability of the governor to the governed. They essentially articulate a governance which is an ethics which includes acting with fairness and impartiality and acting conscientiously. Ethical requirements thus flow from the nature of democratic government.

It is my submission that the ethical requirement also flows from the responsible exercise of power in public administration which is properly both outcome and process based. As the new public management based on outcomes alone gives way to what the Denhardt's call the new public service, adherence to ethical standards become imperative. The ideological assault on public service of the last 30 years has weakened the ethical practices of government and administration. This is very evident in Toronto for, as Justice Bellamy has noted, results based action oriented governance and administration guided the Lastman years. With a re-emergence of a public service which is both process and outcome based and has as its goal the fostering of citizenship and citizen participation in governance and administration, ethical understanding is critical.

Morality and ethics are huge topics embracing ages old ideals. What follows are some simple suggestions which this work is heading. Morality and ethics are often seen as synonymous. This is not inappropriate but it is suggested a division more for convenience and analytical clarity rather than as an attempt to contribute in any way to philosophy or philosophical discourse is a useful construct. Morality is about making judgments and has been seen as essential to social being and social solidarity. Ethics is the study of standards of conduct, the setting of standards and conduct and the analysis of conduct itself. Ethics law focuses on the setting, inculcation and enforcement of standards.

Before moving onto a discussion of current law in Ontario respecting conflict and conduct, it is instructive as well to briefly discuss the values vs rules debate. At its root, proponents of the values approach to ethics in government argue that the way to ensure ethical conduct in government is to provide guides to conduct as well as training about core values which in turn will help public servants avoid ethical dilemmas or alternately be equipped to use their new found understanding to solve such dilemmas. Against this those who believe in a rules based approach argue that even if people understand what is ethically proper they will not necessarily follow ethical practices (hence one needs to have rules, enforcement and punishment for failure to adhere to the rule). These views are always presented as alternates which is unfortunate as they are not actually opposites. However it is becoming increasingly apparent that an approach which utilizes thinking and methods from both is what we need. Much of what follows may be seen as a rules based approach although it also has education and values training aspects to it (especially in the role and work of the Integrity Commissioner).

Conflict and Conduct in Ontario Municipal Law

Several statutes, both federal and provincial, regulate or deal with government ethics generally at the local level in Ontario. Among them are the Criminal Code which prohibits municipal corruption which is abuse and misuse of office, the Municipal Elections Act which sets rules and requirements regarding campaign financing and the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act which sets rules regarding access to confidential third party information as well as respecting the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. These statutes are important but today I shall focus on two others which either regulate key ethics matters or provide for the opportunity to regulate them. They are the Municipal Act, 2001 and the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, the latter of which remains the pre-eminent ethics law for the local level in Ontario.

The Municipal Act contains several key sections which relate to conduct of councilors and to possible control of such conduct by Council itself. Councilors themselves are required by s.232 of the Act to make a declaration on taking office which indicates that they are to behave ethically and faithfully serve the community in which they have been elected. The declaration says in part:

· I will truly, faithfully and impartially exercise this office to the best of my knowledge and ability.

· I have not received and will not receive any payment or reward, or promise thereof, for the exercise of this office in a biased, corrupt or in any other improper manner.

· I will disclose any pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in accordance with the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

Respecting council's powers to control conduct, without going into great detail sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Act convey governance powers and natural person powers of a general nature which might be used to deal with conduct issues. As well s. 224 indicates among other things that it is the role of council to: (a) to represent the public and to consider the well-being and interests of the municipality; (b) to develop and evaluate the policies and programs of the municipality;… and (e) to maintain the financial integrity of the municipality. Further s.238 requires that municipalities enact procedure bylaws to regulate the calling of meetings and the proceedings of meetings. The Act also has open meeting rules.

There is also what I would call a reduced omnibus clause which says:

130. A municipality may regulate matters not specifically provided for by this Act or any other Act for purposes related to the health, safety and well-being of the inhabitants of the municipality.

This section used to be s.102 of the Municipal Act and it used to include the word morality in it (and wellbeing was welfare). The current section has a health orientation to it but might still be used by some enterprising lawyer to regulate conduct. It is important because much of what the City of Toronto has done so far has rested on the authority of s.102 which no longer exists. Note though that the reports on the Code state that they will be updated to reflect changes to the Municipal Act brought by the transformation of the Act in 2001.

One could argue that there is enough latitude in the various bits and pieces throughout the statute to establish codes of conduct of some sort (more on this later).

The other main statute which deals with ethics is the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act . This statute codifies and enhances the common law methods of dealing with conflict of interest respecting council actions and decisions. Conflicts of interest occur in the public sector where a conflict arises between an official's private interest and his or her public duties. The MCIA defines this more narrowly as a clash between a councilor's or other board member's pecuniary interests and his or her public duty. Section 5 of the Act contains the core rules for how to deal with a conflict once it arises. Section 5 states in part:

5 (1)Where a member, either on his or her own behalf or while acting for, by, with or through another, has any pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in any matter and is present at a meeting of the council or local board at which the matter is the subject of consideration, the member,

(a) shall, prior to any consideration of the matter at the meeting, disclose the interest and the general nature thereof;

(b) shall not take part in the discussion of, or vote on any question in respect of the matter; and

(c) shall not attempt in any way whether before, during or after the meeting to influence the voting on any such question.

This is the heart and soul of conflict of interest regulation at the municipal level in this province. The Act defines indirect interest, outlines exceptions, develops concepts such as deemed interests and the like, but the rules in s. 5 are the core method of dealing with conflict of interest.

In closing this section on the current state of the law it is important to note that the common law also applies to council decision making where such action entails administrative and quasi-judicial decisions. Here council is subject to the rules of natural justice and more broadly fairness. It is interesting to note that some of the key decisions in the development of administrative law have been made in the municipal law field (e.g. cases such as Wiswell v Winnipeg, Save Richmond Farmland and the Old St Boniface case).

Ethics Law Enforcement - Need for a Commission

The statutes dealing with conduct have limited express means of dealing with conduct issues and enforcing conflict of interest rules. It is imperative, because of the weakness of the current regulatory regimes, to establish some kind of ethics commission or commissions. The current system is simply inadequate.

With respect to the Municipal Act, one method of dealing with unethical conduct is the judicial inquiry. Section 274 allows municipalities to investigate misconduct and it says in part:

274(1)  If a municipality so requests by resolution, a judge of the Superior Court of Justice shall,

(a) investigate any supposed breach of trust or other misconduct of a member of council, an employee of the municipality or a person having a contract with the municipality in relation to the duties or obligations of that person to the municipality;

(b) inquire into any matter connected with the good government of the municipality;

One argument is that, given that this is the only express method of dealing with misconduct or more precisely with investigating breaches of codes one might well establish for purposes of regulating conduct, judicial investigation is the only means to really deal with misconduct (This is implied in the RSJ Holdings case which arose here in London). One senses though, with due respect to the learned judge, that this is too narrow. There is no reason not to argue that breaches of codes established by council are provincial offences as other breaches of other bylaws are and are thus enforceable via city prosecution in the provincial courts.

The prosecutory method speculated on above though has its own problems. It would require enforcement in the courts by staff against members of council. The practical political and administrative problems of forcing the city solicitor or bylaw enforcement officer into this kind of position are real enough. It also would be conducted in courts not known for their sympathy with or understanding of the municipal scene. Still it is a possibility.

With respect to the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, there is a method established by sections 8 and 9 for ensuring councilors follow the rule. It allows any "elector" to challenge a councilor in court if the elector believes the councilor and then indicates a judge can declare a seat vacant if the case is made against a councilor. This system, now in place for decades is also filled with difficulty as it is a high hurdle with many costs, financial and social, for an "elector" to take action. The absence of a section enabling council to bring such a law suit is troubling and is one of many reasons councils take the position it is not up to them to police conflict of interest. This is a huge issue and problem.

With respect to common law breaches, here again if one senses that there has been such a breach, one must go to court and this has the problems noted above.

So one answer is creating a commission but, in the current conjuncture, it is only possible to create one with limited scope of activity and power of action. This problem has been well understood at the provincial and municipal levels for well over a decade. A provincial committee of inquiry reported on the state of municipal conflict of interest in the late 80s and recommended the creation of a province wide conflict of interest commissioner to deal with the municipal level (note that there is a provincial commissioner (and was then as well). In the early nineties the then NDP government enacted legislation to deal with this problem. It enacted the Local Government Disclosure of Interest Act which included a commissioner. The Act was repealed by the Conservative government shortly after it was elected and before the Act ever became operational. The Act did cause a certain outcry from municipalities, particularly smaller ones, and it would have been another government watchdog which presumably the Harris government did not want to fund.

Types of Ethics Commissions

Before going on to discuss the Toronto case, it is instructive to consider some types of commissions which could be established and the characteristics of commissions already in existence.

First there are single and multi purpose commissions. The former look at one issue, for example conflict of interest and the latter deal with a variety of issues which relate to integrity of office holding and which include not only conflict of interest but things such as misuse of information and abuse of office.

Secondly, commissions may be established with a variety of functions such as advisory, investigative, and hearing functions.

Finally one can envision and indeed there are examples of ombudsman, prosecutory and tribunal like commissions. The first of these would have investigative, report and recommendation powers, the second would have investigative powers and the option to pursue prosecutions of cases against officials, and the third would be a tribunal which would hear allegations of breaches of conduct and make orders related to any breach it determined had occurred. All might have advisory functions. Exemplary of the ombudsman style are all of the commissions currently operating at the provincial and federal levels. Exemplary of the second model was the model enacted in the LGDIA and exemplary of the third are many commissions at the local and state level in the United States.

The Toronto Initiative

Amidst this legal maze and amidst recent scandals, the City of Toronto decided it had to do something. It latched onto the idea of a commissioner to police its own Code of Conduct. This is not the first time the City has tried to do something when there were problems at Council as well as whiffs of inappropriate lobbying and the like.

In the late 80s the pre-amalgamation City enacted one of the first local Codes of Conduct for Council along with the first municipal lobbyist register in Canada. Enforcement then was left to the City Solicitor and to some extent the City Clerk.

In the early nineties what had become a lobbyist disclosure system was repealed for cost reasons. In the amalgamation era the Code was changed substantially, financial disclosure of assets and liabilities of councilors for example was deleted.

In the current era, a Code of Conduct was established in 1999, an "Ethics Steering Committee was established in 2000, a complaints protocol was created in 2002 and an Integrity Commissioner was appointed in 2004. There have been other initiatives such as monitoring lobbying with respect to purchasing matters and voluntary monitoring of lobbying of councilors have been undertaken. The discussion which follows focuses on the Code, complaint handling and the Commissioner.

The Code, created in 1999, applies to members of council and appointees to local boards and local agencies. It is not directed at staff although it should be noted that there is a conflict of interest policy for staff which was adopted by Council in 2000 and which is presumably now seen as part of the conditions of employment in Toronto. The focus in this paper is on the Code for Councillors.

Principles underlieing the Code as articulated in civic documents are that: members of Council are to serve and be seen to serve in a conscientious and diligent manner; members shall not use "the influence of their office" for purposes other than "official duties"; members are expected to perform their duties in a manner that promotes public confidence and will bear "close public scrutiny"; and members shall seek to serve the public interest by upholding both the letter and the spirit of the law.

The Code itself operates in the interstices of other law. The MCIA for example remains the only law regulating conflict of interest at the local level and the City, by virtue of its constitutional and subordinate situation cannot alter its ambit or create by-laws which run counter to it. Hence the Code attempts to prohibit activities which appear to be currently unregulated.

Some examples are the prohibition of receipt of gifts, fees and advances for personally benefit that is connected with duties of office (although there are a series of exceptions to this); the prohibition of inappropriate use of city property and facilities; the prohibition of certain business relations such as acting as a paid agent before Council, its committees and agencies and prohibiting members from using City staff in partisan political activities. There are positive obligations such as behaving with decorum at Council and there is an obligation "to be vigilant in their duty to serve public interests when faced with lobbying activity".

The Code is referred to as an agreement between Council members and was adopted by "confirmatory bylaw". It was not adopted as a specific by-law which could have been enforced under the Provincial Offences Act and could have resulted in a fine of up to $5000). Members simply agreed to follow it.

Ethics Steering Committee

Enforcement is almost a non-issue under such a Code. However, complaints in the first instance, that is under the 1999 Code were to be sent to the Mayor.

An Ethics Committee was created to advise on various matters regarding ethics in Toronto's government. The move toward this was no doubt fuelled by the evolving Computer leasing crisis.

Members realized that there needed to be a complaint handling process beyond this and there was movement towards creating a complaint handling protocol. The Complaint Protocol contained then and contains now two methods for handling complaints - one informal and one formal.

The informal method essentially requires a member of staff or the public or council confronting a member of council who they believe has contravened the Code and trying to get the person to change action or behaviour. The method entails speaking with the "offender", speaking with someone else and keeping a record of the incidents. This may be alright for very minor problems but without sufficient whistleblower protection this will not work especially in a climate where staff does not feel safe.

The formal method entails making a written request setting out an allegation with a supporting affidavit, classification and/or dismissal of the complaint, investigation of it, and reporting of findings to Council. Classification is necessary because if the complaint entails matters beyond the Code it has to be referred elsewhere. In the ESC days the initial classification was to be done by the Committee and the investigation was to be handled by an outside lawyer chosen by the City solicitor (no suppliers or lawyers list appears top have been made). The lawyer would then report it out.

Now the Integrity Commissioner handles the complaints - i.e. classifies, investigates where appropriate, reports to Council and recommends corrective action. Council is obligated to respond to the report within 90 days of its being laid before Council. It is unclear what Council can or will do with such a report.

To be fair one of the important aspects of this would be the publicity arising from the report. The cleansing light of day may help to effect a solution as a person found to be misbehaving might then wish to or be socially and politically pressured to recant and change his or her ways.

The Integrity Commissioner

The creation of the Commissioner's Office and the appointment by Council of David Mullan, a well known and much respected administrative law professor, are new and important steps in the evolution of ethics regulation at the City and in the Province and country as well.

As we have seen the Commissioner has responsibility respecting complaint handling and investigation. The Commissioner has education functions as well as he is to enlighten Councilors, staff and the public as to the workings of his office.

The Commissioner is also to be an advisor to councilors although the exact nature of this function needs more elaboration (It is presumably supposed to mimic the advisory function of the Provincial Integrity Commissioner). The Commissioner may provide general advice to Council about the MCIA but not specific advice to councilors. They must seek outside legal advice.

The Commissioner has policy functions. He is to advise Council on how the City's ethics system may be improved and presumably will advise the City on what ways it can enhance the system through amendments to the City of Toronto Act.

The Commissioner issued his first interim report in April of this year. Characterizing his functions as Advisory, Complaint Investigation, Complaint Adjudication, and Educational, he described the creation of the Office and his work to that point. He noted that councilors were beginning to use his advisory service (19 requests for advice from 15 councillors). He indicated that there were 9 formal complaints (two were settled, one was rejected for lack of jurisdiction, two were the subject of upcoming reports and 4 were ongoing). He indicated that he encourages informal settlements of complaints as is typical of this kind of office in Canada. He also indicated that educational initiatives were just beginning and not much had been done yet.

Limitations and Problems Identified by the Commissioner

In his Interim Report, the Commissioner stated that he interviewed or met with City Councillors to discuss the Code. He found different levels of awareness of the Code and what it does and of his mandate. This may well have changed since April given his own efforts as well as publicity around various issues and given the issuing of and debate about the Bellamy Report.

Regarding members of the public, he noted that many were complaining about matters of administrative fairness which in general was beyond his mandate. As an aside one wonders just when there will be ombudsman jurisdiction at the municipal level in this province.

He laments having no jurisdiction over staff, noting that it may be asymmetrical (i.e staff being able to complain about councilors but he cannot do anything about councilor complaints about staff).

Some specific matters he touched on in his report were the vagueness of the gift receipt provisions and the vague standard of councilors being required to bee vigilant about lobbying (ie being subject to lobbying). As well the idea of conflicts of interests is becoming more complex (here he seems to be discussing conflicts of duties in part).

He does note the lack of sanction power for the Commissioner and for Council itself. Here he notes there will have to be amendment to the City of Toronto Act.

He raises a number of issues with the complaints process. The cumbersome aspect of complaint by affidavit is raised for example.

Reforming the Current Model - Bellamy's Recommendations

Madame Justice Bellamy reported on the Toronto Computer Leasing matter in September of this year. She of course reported on the computer leasing issues but she also reported on a range of governance issues among which were the need for an enhanced Code of Conduct, an empowered Integrity Commissioner, a gift registry and a new and expanded lobbyist registry. She also suggested a conceptual shift in the way conflict of interest is understood and in turn suggested that more issues must be dealt with in this realm.

All of Justice Bellamy's recommendations focus on what Toronto should do. Some of her suggestions may not be possible unless and until the City obtains enhanced powers from the province.

The focus here will be on the transformation of the Integrity Commissioner which she calls for but it is important briefly to note some of the kinds of things she is calling for in the Code, conflict and registry areas because if followed they will enlarge the concerns and duties of the Integrity Commissioner.

Bellamy recommends that the codes for both councilors and staff be enhanced and that they set out minimum standards and high ideals. They would be in plain language. Political staff would be required to adhere to them. Training respecting the codes would be mandatory and ongoing and, in a variety of ways, the City would be called on to promote awareness of the codes. The codes would be monitored vigilantly.

The code for councillors would contain prohibitions about appropriate behaviour of councilors vis a vis staff (e.g. not asking staff to perform personal services for councilors, not asking staff to engage in partisan political conduct). The codes for both councilors and staff would contain rules concerning both apparent and real conflicts of interest (Note that Bellamy states that "an apparent conflict of interest exists when someone could reasonably conclude that a conflict of interest exists"). Moreover she focuses on private interests not just pecuniary or financial interests. Councillors should recuse themselves when there is a real or apparent conflict of interest and staff should not involve themselves in decisions where there are such conflicts.

In her discussion of other specific conflicts of interest Bellamy describes some behaviours which councilors ought not to do but which, it is respectfully submitted are beyond conflict of interest. For example she states that councilors and staff "should not use their position to further their private interests". A more specific example is that they should not accept outside employment which is incompatible with or in conflict with their official task. All of her suggestions in this context reflect the transformation of concern from conflict of interest per se to the larger area of integrity and appropriate behaviour. There are two dilemmas here - one is that it conflates conflict of interest and is conceptually muddy and the other is that some of the prohibitions she suggests are actually descriptions of corrupt behaviours which are in fact already prohibited by the Criminal Code in the municipal corruption section.

Still her suggestions would enlarge and enhance the work of the Commissioner and partly no doubt because of this she suggests enhancing the current Integrity Commissioner model in certain ways. She calls for a full time commissioner, one who would report directly to council not just the mayor and one who would serve for a fixed term (removable only by a 2/3 vote of the Council).

In terms of advice she would have an ethics coordinator system set up with the input of the Integrity Commissioner. She would have the Integrity Commissioner be able to advise both councilors and staff. She recommends that council consider expanding the role of the current Integrity Commissioner to allow confidential review of the personal finances of councilors on their request so that the commissioner can advise them on potential conflicts of interest.

In terms of complaints she calls for a broadening of the Commissioner's investigative powers. She would also empower the Commissioner to reject frivolous complaints.

In terms of reporting and investigation, she would have the Commissioner be able to recommend an "appropriate range of sanctions" to council ranging from apology to expulsion from committees to declaring a seat vacant. She would not allow the Commissioner to impose sanctions directly and hence would maintain the ombudsman approach now in place.

Assessment of the Current Proposals for Expansion of the Integrity Commissioner Model

Justice Bellamy's recommendations for a full time Commissioner and one with a fixed term are important for securing the independence of the Office.

With respect to the Code enhancement along the lines suggested by Madame Justice Bellamy would entrench the City's model as in integrity rather than simply a conflict of interest model. Expansion of the understanding of conflict of interest to include apparent and real conflicts is consistent with the development of the law in these areas generally. Entering the field on matters other than conflicts is important for a broad approach to improving ethics. The fly in the ethics ointment however is the potential for confusion between corruption and an expanded definition of conflicts of interest and also potential for jurisdictional overlap and conflict between federal and provincial legislation.

As the Commissioner and the Justice have noted, the Commissioner lacks strong investigative powers which is atypical of such commissioners in Canada. He is to be allowed access to all city documents and premises but lacks a general summons and subpoena power which is the real stuff of investigative power. Enhancing his investigative powers will require provincial legislation as the City cannot create such powers itself.

Enhancing and encouraging the Commissioners advisory and educational capacities is important. Properly resourced, advisory and educational efforts will help transform the ethical climate and culture of the City.

Justice Bellamy has recommended enhanced recommendation options for the Commissioner and has recommended the continuance of the ombudsman model. There is much power to his model and it has been successful at the provincial level. Other models could have been considered butt do not appear to have been so. For example, why not have a model which creates provincial offences. Why not set up a "committee of electors" as a prosecutorial model and use the law suit method of the MCIA or allow the Integrity Commissioner to prosecute under the MCIA. These options could be done without enhanced powers from the province

Justice Bellamy recommended confidential financial disclosure so that councilors could receive advice. Why not require financial disclosure of assets under the Code so the public will have some potential evidence of potential conflicts of interest. Council could require financial disclosure of assets and liabilities of councilors pursuant to the Municipal Act. My sense is that one could tie this disclosure to council proceedings and the requirement to have a procedure by-law.

Towards an Effective Model in the Future

The Bellamy enhancements if enacted or promulgated will no doubt be helpful in changing the ethics culture in Toronto. However it is not clear how other legislation would have to be changed to make the Toronto system work and what this would do to the overall conflict of interest regime.

Some further options already hinted at above which would enhance the enforcement possibilities might be:

1. through statutory amendment, empowering the Integrity Commissioner to investigate and to prosecute conflict of interest as defined by the MCIA. This follows the idea of the LGDIA. One issue is that it might cause problems to do this only for Toronto. In such a model the independence of the Commissioner must be strengthened by strengthening the investigative powers, by possibly changing the appointment process and by making the position a required and legislated position.

2. amending of the Municipal Act to require the setting up of municipal ethics/integrity commissioners either locally or regionally. The expense of running a commission could be made less onerous if shared by municipalities across regions or the province.

3. setting up a provincial commission to deal with municipal conflict of interest or empower the provincial ombudsman to deal with administrative justice issues including conflict of interest at the local level.

4. while it will likely be some time before ethics commissions generally in Canada, whether local or provincial, will be set up along anything other than the ombudsman model, considering the establishment of ethics commissions on the American model, i.e. as tribunals with order power is worthwhile. The ombudsman model has much power but it may be that something stronger is required at the local level. The model has appeal because it creates an independent decision maker who or which has the power to order change with no debate at Council and because it would allow the development of expertise typical of administrative boards and tribunals. It may be appropriate particularly for conflict of interest issues specifically as opposed to all ethics issues.

Conclusion

In closing, ethics law and ethics regulation are important in ensuring confidence in government and in public service. Current ethics law at the local level requires change in the method of enforcement and Toronto's Integrity Commissioner model, while interesting, is limited in scope and power. Further change is needed to effect meaningful ethics regulation and it is to be hoped it will be undertaken soon. Changes have been suggested by both Commissioner Mullan and Madame Justice Bellamy. This is just the beginning. Change will come, the commission idea will grow and may transform from ombudsman to tribunal.

To return to the main page and other links in this website:

HOME