“New Social Movements” of the Early Nineteenth Century

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SOMETIME AFTER 1968, analysts and participants began to speak of “new social movements” that worked outside formal institutional channels and emphasized lifestyle, ethical, or “identity” concerns rather than narrowly economic goals. A variety of examples informed the conceptualization. Alberto Melucci (1988: 247), for instance, cited feminism, the ecology movement or “greens,” the peace movement, and the youth movement. Others added the gay movement, the animal rights movement, and the antiabortion and prochoice movements. These movements were allegedly new in issues, tactics, and constituencies. Above all, they were new by contrast to the labor movement, which was the paradigmatic “old” social movement, and to Marxism and socialism, which asserted that class was the central issue in politics and that a single political economic transformation would solve the whole range of social ills. They were new even by comparison with conventional liberalism with its assumption of fixed individual

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identities and interests. The new social movements thus challenged the conventional division of politics into left and right and broadened the definition of politics to include issues that had been considered outside the domain of political action (Scott 1990).

These new social movements (NSMs) grew partly from the New Left and related student movements of the 1960s. The conceptualization of their novelty was part of the movements themselves as well as of the academic analyses that (primarily in Europe) took debate on these movements as an occasion to reform or reject Marxist theory and social democratic politics. The emphasis on novelty was extended to claims of epochal change when the NSMs were taken as signs of postindustrial or postmodern society. In this paper, however, I argue that the historical claim implicit in the idea of new social movements (as in the ideas of postmodernism and postindustrialism) is spurious. I explore the major distinguishing characteristics attributed to NSMs in the recent literature and show that these fit very well the many movements that flourished in the late eighteenth and especially early nineteenth centuries. My point is not just negative; however; I do not suggest that we abandon the notion that NSMs are distinctive to the late twentieth century.

Abandoning the false historical claim enables us to understand better the whole modern history of social movements. This is so in three senses. First, as Tarrow (1989) has suggested, many of the characteristics described in the flourishing movements of the 1960s and after may stem from the newness of each movement rather than from novel features of the whole wave of movements. In other words, all movements in their nascent period—including the labor movement and social democracy—tend to fit certain aspects of the NSM model. Second, we are better prepared to analyze all social movements if we pay attention to the inherent plurality of their forms, contents, social bases, and meaning to participants and do not attempt to grasp them in terms of a single model defined by labor or revolutionary movements, or a single set of instrumental questions about mobilization. Within any historical period, at least in the modern era, we can identify a whole field of social movements shaped by their relationships to each other and appealing to different, though overlapping, potential participants. Of the various movements in such a field, we can fruitfully ask the kinds of questions pioneered by new social movement theory—
about identity politics, the possibility of thinking of movements as ends in themselves, and so forth—and not just those of resource mobilization or Marxism. Third, if we abandon both the developmentalism that treats early nineteenth-century movements as either precursors to the later consolidation of labor and socialism or else as historical sidetracks, and the opposite refusal to look for macrohistorical patterns, we can begin to explore what factors determine whether (in specific settings) periods are characterized by proliferation or consolidation or expansion or contraction in the social movement field as a whole.

Social movement fields include many different kinds of movements; this diversity and the interrelationships among different movements are obscured by overly narrow definitions of social movements. Tilly, for example, approaches movements in terms of an analysis of collective action with “five big components: interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself” (1978: 7); this leaves out self-understanding and emphasizes instrumental pursuits. Similarly, Tarrow, Tilly, and others have built the idea of conflict and opposition to “established authorities” into their approaches to social movements—as part of “protest” in Tarrow’s (1988) case and “contention” in Tilly’s (1978, 1986). This focuses their attention on movements with strong economic and political agendas and away from more “cultural” ones. Touraine’s definition goes nearly to the opposite extreme: social movements are normatively oriented interactions between adversaries with conflicting interpretations and opposed models of a shared cultural field; in his view NSMs contended with other groups in civil society rather than with the state (1981: 31–32). This is a helpful corrective, but we should not prejudge the question of orientation to the state. For one thing, this is a two-way street. States are institutionally organized in ways that provide recognition for some identities and arenas for some conflicts and freeze others out. States themselves thus shape the orientations of NSMs as well as the field of social movements more generally.

The key point is that it is misleading to compartmentalize religious movements, for example, apart from more stereotypically social or political ones. Religious movements may have political and economic agendas—particularly when politics is not seen as exclusively a matter of relations to the state. More basically, as E.P. Thompson (1968) showed clearly, religious and labor
movements can influence each other, compete for adherents, and complement each other in the lives of some participants: in short, they can be part of the same social movement field. Part of the problem is that much of the traditional analysis of social movements (and collective action more generally) has ignored or explicitly set aside questions of culture or the interpretation of meaning. This tends to deflect attention away from those movements concerned largely with values, norms, language, identities, and collective understandings—including those of movement participants themselves—and toward those that focus instrumentally on changing political or economic institutions. Social movement analysts have also often avoided addressing emotions, perhaps for fear of association with discredited accounts of mass psychology. For present purposes, it is better to see social movements as including all attempts to influence patterns of culture, social action, and relationships in ways that depend on the participation of large numbers of people in concerted and self-organized (as distinct from state-directed or institutionally mandated) collective action.

Both the wide range of recent social movements and the literature labeling them NSMs encourage such a broader view. Rather than dismissing NSM theory because of its historical misrepresentation, we should see the importance of the issues it raises for understanding social movements generally. “Identity politics” and similar concerns were never quite so much absent from the field of social movement activity—even in the heydays of liberal party politics or organized trade union struggle—as they were obscured from conventional academic observation. Particularly after 1848, just as socialism became more “scientific,” so social scientists lost sight of the traditions of direct action, fluid and shifting collective identities, and communitarian and other attempts to overcome the means/ends division of more instrumental movement organization (Calhoun 1989). The secularism of academics particularly and post-Enlightenment intellectuals generally may have made collective action based on religious and other more spiritual orientations appear of a different order from the “real” social movement of trade-union-based socialism or from liberal democracy. Nationalism was often treated as a regressive deviation rather than a modern form of social movement and identity formation. Early feminism attracted relatively little scholarly attention until later feminism prompted its rediscovery.
In short, one kind of movement—formally organized, instrumental action aimed at economic or institutionally political goals—was relatively new and ascendant through much of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries and has often been misidentified as simply a progressive tendency, the rational future of politics, or even insurgent politics. This pattern was particularly pronounced in Europe during the ascendency of labor and social democracy, and it is what made America look exceptional. But nowhere were movement politics ever limited to this form. While America had relatively weak trade unions and socialist politics, it nurtured a relatively strong and open proliferation of the other sort of social movement, new social movements. This has been true throughout American history, and it is very marked in the early nineteenth-century period on which this paper focuses. The flowering of movements in this period was, however, international (as I will illustrate with brief examples from France and Britain). Indeed, the social movement field of the early nineteenth century was inherently international, linking participants in different countries not only by communications but by a pattern of migration in which people literally moved from one country to another without leaving their movement contexts. Remember Marx’s ties to German radicals in London and his writing for their newspaper in New York and recall the émigré intellectual ferment of Paris between 1830 and 1848 (Kramer 1988). Migration to America—to join a socialist commune or to establish a religious community, for example—was a prominent feature of the era and often tied to movement participation. We have only to recall the travels of Tom Paine, however, to remind ourselves that the Atlantic crossing could be reversed.

THE IDEA OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The idea of new social movements has been brought into academic currency by several authors with various conceptual frameworks. In all cases, the concept is defined through a crucial counterexample: the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century working-class or labor movement. This is understood primarily in the singular (while new social movements are plural). The backdrop to the idea of NSMs, thus, is the notion that labor struggles had an implicit telos and were potentially transformative for the whole society.
This was conceptualized sometimes in largely economic terms as the transcendence of capitalism and other times in more political terms as the social democratic transformation of modern states. In either case, a single movement protagonist was generally assumed to have posed the social question. At one time, thus, it was common to speak of the social movement that would bring about the course of social change. NSM theorists hold that this is no longer plausible, if it ever was. In varying degrees they emphasize post-industrial society (Touraine 1971), the options opened by relative affluence and a growing middle class (Offe 1985), the turn to individually defined needs after the common denominator of material sustenance had been satisfied (Melucci 1989; Inglehart 1990), and expansion of the welfare state (Offe 1985). Their positive examples come from the wide range of movements that began to engage people in the 1960s and 1970s after the apparent conservative quiescence of the 1950s. For Touraine (1988), a key question is whether these new movements could ever coalesce in order to embody some of the decisive potential for social transformation once attributed to the labor movement and socialism. Habermas (1984) suggests not, theorizing NSMs in terms of a broader post-Marxist account of why movements can no longer hold the potential for fundamental social transformation in a society where the lifeworld is colonized by economic and administrative systems and large-scale state and capitalist structures are inescapable. He sees the movements as part of the resistance of lifeworld to system. Similarly, Cohen and Arato (1992) and Touraine (1985) treat NSMs as part of the struggle for civil society to maintain autonomy from state and economy and as a source of reform and the introduction of new concerns into political agendas. For Melucci (1981, 1989), NSMs must be seen simply as ends in themselves.

Melucci (1989) also employs the common postmodernist trope of arguing against the "metanarrative" of socialist liberation (Lyotard 1984). With others, he sees the labor movement's claim to be the main or exclusive source of progressive change or representative for those disadvantaged by the established order as intrinsically repressive, not just historically obsolete. In order to mount their challenge to that "old" social movement, however, these NSM theorists have exaggerated the extent to which it ever was a unified historical actor with a single narrative and a disciplining institutional structure. They have reified and hypostatized the
labor movement, setting up the most simplistic Marxist accounts as their straw men. In fact, the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century working-class movement (if it even can be described more than tendentiously as a single movement) was multidimensional, only provisionally and partially unified, and not univocal (Katznelson and Zolberg 1987). It did not constitute just one collective actor in a single social drama. There was mobilization over wages, to be sure, but also over women and children working, community life, the status of immigrants, education, access to public services, and so forth. Movement activity constantly overflowed the bounds of the label labor. Similarly, the categories of class and class struggle have been used far from the Marxian ideal type of wage laborers in industrial capitalist factories. Artisans and agricultural workers, white collar and service employees, and even small proprietors (not to mention spouses and children of all these) have joined in the struggles or been grouped in the category of the working class. Throughout the history of labor and class movements, there has been contention over who should be included in them and how both common and different identities should be established. Indeed, ironically, by leading to research on the protests of women, people of color, and other marginalized people, the recent growth of NSMs has helped to explode the myth that the narrowly white, male labor movement, against which NSMs were defined, was completely predominant.

Other NSM theorists not only exaggerate labor’s one-time hegemony over the social movement field, they tie it to a meta-narrative of their own. Inglehart thus treats a move from “materialist” or economistic orientations to “postmaterialism” as a simple linear development based on achievement of higher material standards of living and greater economic security. He explicitly claims that “in the takeoff phase of industrial revolution, economic growth was the central problem. Postmaterialists have become increasingly numerous in recent decades and they place less emphasis on economic growth and more emphasis on the noneconomic quality of life” (1990: 373). Inglehart offers no evidence, however, for the assumption that economic orientations predominated during the early years of industrialization or that nonmaterialism appears only late in the story. The following pages show that the beginning years of industrialization were particularly fertile for the proliferation of nonmaterialist movements; if these were ever really in abeyance
for long, it was in the more industrialized later nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries.

DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Throughout the early nineteenth century, communitarianism, temperance, and various dietary and lifestyle movements attracted hundreds of thousands of adherents in both Europe and America. Religious awakening, revitalization, and proliferation were major themes, as were anticlericalism and freethinking. Antislavery or abolitionist movements were often closely linked to religion but were autonomous from any particular religious organizations. Popular education was the object of struggle, with early success in America. Even after mid-century, the divergence between Europe and America should not be exaggerated. The nationalist discourse of the (northern) Union before and after the Civil War—including even “manifest destiny”—was not altogether different from the nationalist discourse of Giuseppe Mazzini and Young Europe or of Giuseppe Garibaldi. Nativism was recurrent throughout the nineteenth century, from the Know-Nothings through populism, and the racial, ethnic, and religious hostilities taken to an extreme by the Ku Klux Klan were not altogether different from the xenophobic side of nationalism. Ethnic and nationalist movements, moreover, were never as fully suppressed by class as Melucci (1989: 89–92) suggests but have ebbed and flowed throughout modernity. Women’s and temperance movements renewed mobilizations dating from the eighteenth century.

The early nineteenth century was fertile ground for social movements as perhaps no other period was until the 1960s. Indeed, direct ancestors of several of the movements that sparked the new social movement conceptualization in the 1960s and 1970s were part of the early nineteenth-century efflorescence. In the early nineteenth century too, the labor movement itself was a new social movement and not clearly first among equals, let alone hegemonic; the idea that a class-based movement might claim to be all encompassing was not widespread. If we ignore the claim that they apply distinctively to the late twentieth century, the core ideas of NSM theory offer a useful lens for looking at early nineteenth-century social movements. Specifically, I turn now to a list of
the most widely cited distinguishing features of late twentieth-century NSMs. Relying for the most part on brief examples, I show that each was a prominent concern or feature of early nineteenth-century social movements.

Identity, Autonomy and Self-realization

Compared with the largely instrumental and economic goals of both the institutionalized labor movement and the European social democratic parties, NSMs have been crucially focused on "identity politics" (Aronowitz 1992). Many of these movements themselves, however, have roots in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: modern feminist ideology is often traced to Mary Wollstonecraft, and the broader women's movement to the substantial concern with sexual equality and redefinition of gender in Owenite socialism (Taylor 1983) and to the disproportionate participation of women in abolitionist, temperance, and other "moral crusades" of the early nineteenth century.

The tracing of roots, however, is not necessarily the identification of a linear, unidirectional process of development. Claiming an autonomous identity and a moral voice for women often took a different form in the early nineteenth century than in succeeding years. Indeed, Rendall has argued that the very assumptions of twentieth-century feminists about equality make it hard "to understand that the assertion of an 'equality in difference' could mean a radical step forward... Stress on the latent moral superiority of women could bring with it the basis for a new confidence, a new energy, a new assertion of women's potential power" (1985a: 3).

This is more easily recognized in the frame of reference established by the NSMs (and much recent poststructuralist and feminist theory) than in that of the classical liberalism or universalism informing the assumptions to which Rendall refers. The words of the Owenite Catherine Barmby, "Woman and man are two in variety and one in equality" (quoted in Rendall 1985b: 308), no longer sound so unfamiliar. Early nineteenth-century women argued from a claim to morally—and publicly—relevant difference not again so clearly formulated until the final quarter of the twentieth century. "As it is the Divine Will that the two sexes together shall constitute humanity, so I believe it to be the Divine intention that the influence and exertion of the two sexes combined shall
be necessary to the complete success of any human institution, or any branch of such institution" (Agnes Davis Pochin 1855: quoted in Rendall 1985: 312). Not only was there a claim that the different qualities of men and women were complementary (as the broader culture also asserted, though with more bias); there was a claim to moral authority grounded within the domestic sphere, which was in the early nineteenth century becoming increasingly separated from the public sphere. “Within that primarily domestic world, women could and did create a culture which was not entirely an imposed one, which contained within it the possibilities of assertion. . . . That assertion could become the assertion of autonomy” (Rendall 1985a: 3). The very claim to distinct and possibly autonomous identity in the domestic sphere ironically became the basis for public claims. As Mary Ryan (1990, 1992) has shown, from 1830 to 1860 there was a rapid increase in the public life of the American citizenry. This was not just a matter of one public growing more active, but of a proliferation of multiple publics. Some of these were autonomously female and constituted themselves in terms of distinct claims to identity not altogether unrelated to those by which the male-dominated public spheres sought to exclude women.

Not only was moral authority claimed for distinctive female identities; gender relations were directly a focus of concern. By no means all of the social movements of the early nineteenth century oriented their action to the public sphere, and still less to organized politics. Withdrawal from mainstream society in order to reconstitute human relations was a central theme of the communitarian movements of the era and of the often millenarian religious movements with which they sometimes overlapped (see below). Robert Owen’s communitarian vision may have turned on a Lockean vision of essential human sameness and malleability, but this was certainly not so for Charles Fourier’s notion of phalansteries composed of 1,620 individuals in order to represent all possible combinations of the essential and distinctive passions of each sex. Gender relations were also an important concern of the New England transcendentalists, innovatively treated as a social movement by Anne Rose. “Alienated by a culture built of fear,” she writes, “the Transcendentalists took steps to establish social relations allowing freedom, growth, justice, and love” (1981: 93). Communitarian experiments like Brook Farm were designed
simultaneously to foster individual self-fulfillment and equitable, nurturant social relationships.

In a very different vein, what was the focus of early nineteenth-century nationalism if not identity? “Nations are individualities with particular talents,” wrote Fichte (quoted by Meinecke 1970: 89). At least through the “springtime of nations” that collided with the mid-century crisis, nationalism was conceived substantially as a liberal and inclusive doctrine, not as the reactionary, exclusionary one it would in many cases become. This “nationalist internationalism” (Walicki 1982) of figures like Mazzini maintained that all true nationalities had rights to autonomous self-expression and indeed cast itself as the defender of liberty against empire (a theme that has never entirely disappeared). Not unlike more recent movements that focused on the legitimation of identities, nationalism grew in part because of the rise of the modern state and the ideology of rights that became a crucial part of its legitimation apparatus and a continual opening for new claims. Nationality, despite nationalism’s own ideology, was never simply a given identity, inherited unproblematically from the past, but always a construction and a claim within a field of identities. Not only did nationalist movements claim autonomy for specific peoples against others (for example, for Hungarians against the Austrian-dominated empire, or briefly for Texans against both Mexico and the United States) they also claimed a primacy for national identity over class, region, dialect, gender, and other subsidiary identities.

Last but not least in this connection, we need to recognize how profoundly early workers’ movements were engaged in a politics of identity. Marx and numerous activists offered the claim that the common identity of worker should take primacy over a diversity of craft, region, ethnic, and other identities. Yet this strong version of the claim to working-class identity was seldom if ever realized, and certainly not in the early nineteenth century. What were achieved were more mediated versions of working-class solidarity in which primary identification with a craft or local group became the means of forging a discourse or movement based on national (or international) class identities. This mediated understanding of class membership is quite different from the categorical Marxist notion of individuals equivalently constituted as members of the working class. Yet it is the fluidity of possible workers’ identi-
tics that stands out in the historiography of the early nineteenth century.

Defense Rather Than Offense

The “old social movement” was utopian and sought to remake the whole of society through overcoming existing relations of domination and exploitation, theorists claim. NSMs, in contrast, defend specific spheres of life; their demands are more limited in scope but are also less negotiable. Here NSM theory points valuably to the importance of the defense of specific lifeworlds and its link to nonnegotiable demands, but through a sharply misleading historical opposition.

The underlying idea is that socialism was a comprehensive utopian project. This is what some of Marxism’s poststructuralist detractors decry in attacking the domination implicit in any claim to order the whole of society (or critical thought). It is also implicit in Habermas’s (1984, 1988) account of how conflicts moved outside the range of distributive issues that welfare states were developed to manage. In this view, the state embodied the utopian drive of labor and social democratic movements but faced crises as the systems of money and power grew to dominate so much of social life that cultural reproduction could no longer provide people with the motivation for either ordinary participation or transformative rebellion. New social movements arose out of this “exhaustion of utopian energies” and embodied a too-often neoconservative focus on defense of endangered ways of life (Habermas 1990: chap. 2). But this seems exactly backward. The labor movement has been as defensive in much of its struggle as any NSM and has hardly always been committed to a thorough restructuring of society. For most of its history the traditional left was normally suspicious of utopian energies, though these occasionally erupted anyway. The “traditional left,” indeed, was formed in the consolidation and institutionalization of a “post-utopian” movement in the late nineteenth century; this replaced the earlier efflorescence of more utopian movements and earned the appellation traditional by resisting the challenge of new movements not just in the 1960s but in the early twentieth century and recurrently. Indeed, much of the new left (like the NSMs more generally) can be understood as an attempt to recover the utopian energies of the early nine-
teenth century? Rooted in the attachments of everyday life and specific communities, these movements were often radical and even utopian in what they sought.

What else, for example, could the perfectionism of the Second Great Awakening mean, if not that people must impose extreme and nonnegotiable demands on themselves and their societies? This might have been the “shopkeepers’ millenium” (Johnson 1978), not Marx’s, but it was certainly utopian. At the same time, it was fueled in part by local community resistance to the impact of centralizing politics and economics. Thus Habermas’s idea that NSMs form largely to defend lifeworld spaces against the “colonization” of large-scale political and economic systems grasps important aspects of crucial nineteenth-century social movements, but this cannot be opposed to utopianism. A similar perfectionism made the utopian socialists utopian, in Marx’s and Engels’s contemptuous view. Think, for example, of Engels’s complaint that St. Simon, Fourier, and Owen claimed to emancipate “all humanity at once,” rather than “a particular class to begin with” (1978 [1892]: 701). Indeed, it is crucial to the very radicalism of some early nineteenth-century social movements (as of many others) that they mounted an unyielding and nonnegotiable defense of traditional ways of life that were threatened by social change (including especially capitalist change). Artisans defending traditional crafts and communities against capitalist industrialization could not settle for better wages, working conditions, or health care. It was this defense of their lifeworlds, however, that made their demands radically incompatible with the expansion of capitalism and that set them apart from most industrial workers who, however violent their anger at any point in time, could potentially be pacified by meliorative measures (Calhoun 1982, 1983a, 1983b).

A different kind of defensive orientation was involved in the withdrawal of various religious groups from intercourse with a corrupting worldly society. This was, indeed, one of the goals of many of the German religious migrants to the United States, from the Amish to the Bruderhoff (Hostetler 1980; Kanter 1972; Zablocki 1970). As Marty (1984: 191) writes of the religious colonists, “most believed in natural human innocence and thought that new social arrangements would end corruption.” A defensive orientation was more common among the earlier pietists than it was among the new wave of communities of the 1840s. The tran-
scentalists at Brook Farm certainly aspired to reach a broader public with their example and their written message, and their program was explicitly forward looking. Similarly, the members of the Hopedale community in Milford, Massachusetts, were regular participants in a variety of extracommunal social movements, conceiving of their community as a base for such broader reforming activities (Walters 1978: 49–51).

Just as the common saying suggests that “the best defense is a good offense,” so it is hard to distinguish defensive from offensive moments in the nineteenth-century communal movement. Indeed, these often appear as two sides of the same utopian ideology. Utopian visions were often rooted in (or derived part of their appeal from) religious traditions and/or images of the recently vanished golden age of craftsmen and small farmers. At the same time, they stood in tension or confrontation with many of the tendencies and characteristics of contemporary society. The line was not sharply drawn between withdrawing from this world to prepare for the next or to protect a purer life, and withdrawing in order to constitute an example that might transform social relations more generally. It is important to see the ways in which early nineteenth-century social movements were rooted in problems and attachments of everyday life and the defense of valued ways of life; it is crucial not to imagine that this made them intrinsically conservative or deprived them of utopian energies. Roots made many movements radical, even when they did not offer comprehensive plans for societal restructuring.

**Politicization of Everyday Life**

Central to the importance of identity politics and defensive orientations is the argument that NSMs are distinctive in politicizing everyday life rather than focusing on the large-scale systems of state and economy. Where the postwar consensus consecrated overall economic growth, distributive gains, and various forms of legal protections as the basic social issues that the political process was to address (Offe 1985: 824), the NSMs brought forward a variety of other issues grounded in aspects of personal or everyday life: sexuality, abuse of women, student rights, protection of the environment.

These were not just new issues of familiar kinds, but a challenge
to the extant division between public and private spheres, state and civil society. The collapsing of divisions between state and economy paved the way (Galbraith 1967; Habermas 1962, 1967). Giant corporations assumed statelike functions in the putatively private economic sphere, while the welfare state was called to defend a growing variety of civil rights and to intervene regularly in the economy. Several explanations for why this gave rise to NSMs contend that a hierarchy of needs notion suggests that affluence made it feasible to stop worrying about the old economic issues and take up these new concerns (Melucci 1989; Inglehart 1990). A political opportunity argument says that the transformed state created new opportunities for the pursuit of grievances (Tarrow 1989). Habermas’s (1988) notion of the colonization of the lifeworld proposes that the erosion of the boundaries between life-world and economic and political system was itself experienced as threatening.

Compared with the postwar consensus, a politicization of everyday life certainly began in the 1960s, but this was not a reversal of long-standing consensus about the proper boundaries of the political. On the contrary, the modern era is shaped by a certain oscillation between politicization and depoliticization of everyday life. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as in the early nineteenth century, social movements brought a range of new phenomena into the public (if not always the political) realm. Indeed, the early labor movements themselves aimed crucially to politicize aspects of everyday life formerly (and by their opponents) not considered properly political. Temperance, abolitionism, campaigns for popular education, and perhaps above all early women’s movements sought public recognition or action with regard to grievances their detractors considered clearly outside the realm of legitimate state action (Evans and Boyte 1986: chap. 3). They were moral crusades in almost exactly the same way as the NSMs are in Klaus Eder’s (1985) description. For parts of the women’s movement this was sometimes a source of contradiction: women had to protest in public and thereby politicize the issue of protecting the female sphere of the private household (Rendall 1985a; see also Ryan 1992). The contradictions have reappeared in the current period, as, for example, when Phyllis Schlafley simultaneously maintained that a woman’s proper (and ideally protected) place is in the home but suggested that she her-
self ought to be appointed to the Supreme Court. In the case of women’s movements, the struggle to politicize aspects of everyday life—and the contradictions around it—continued right through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It recurred also in the temperance/prohibition and civil rights movements. The latter, indeed, is almost a quintessential case, with the proprietors of segregated restaurants, for example, arguing that their decisions about whom to serve were purely private matters, beyond the legitimate reach of the state.

Though there was often great political turmoil—over socialism, for example, and over female suffrage—a fairly consistent set of issues was the center of contention during the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. The main legitimate questions of domestic politics focused on electoral democracy (the full extension of the franchise, the efficacy of political parties, and the prevention of corruption among elected officials) and political economy (the proper role of the state in providing for those individuals capitalism harmed or failed to help, in mediating struggles between workers and employers, or in regulating the flow of workers into labor markets). Populism was a step outside the political norms in some respects (for example, in largely defensive use of direct action, as in attempts by farmers to eliminate middlemen by some combination of new cooperative institutions and intimidation; see Goodwyn 1976) but it stuck for the most part to manifestly political and economic issues. When other issues were raised, they commonly had a very hard time attracting serious attention in the public sphere; the voices of authority consistently outweighed those of dissent. The one great victory of women in this period, thus, was on the issue of suffrage, not on any of the other gender concerns that women voiced.11

Non-Class or Middle-Class Mobilization

A central link between NSM theory and the notion of a post-industrial or postmodern society is the idea that political economic identities have lost their salience and are being replaced by a mixture of ascriptive identities (like race or gender) and personally chosen or expressive identities (like sexual orientation or identification with various lifestyle communities). NSMs, accordingly, neither appeal to nor mobilize predominantly on class lines.
Offe (1985) suggests that members of the new middle class and "decommodified" persons—that is, those with no stable labor market position or identity—are disproportionately involved in NSMs. Though Offe approaches these groups in economic terms, they are in fact hard to assimilate into schemes of class analysis. The decommodified are obviously outside class categories to the extent that these depend on stable positions in the relations of production. The new middle class is usually defined in terms of high levels of education and technical skill combined with employee status rather than ownership of capital. This too is anomalous. More generally, middle-class affluence may facilitate movement activity, but class membership is not the identity that determines choice of NSM. If Offe is right about the new middle class and the decommodified, however, this is a reason to anticipate growth in NSMs: these are both growing segments of the population. Offe even remarks that this makes NSMs similar to the early labor movement, when the numbers of industrial workers were still growing.

Offe is perceptive to note the similarity to the early labor movement, with its internal diversity and only gradually stabilizing conception of a common labor-market position and class identity. Of course, the labor movement remained internally diverse—rent, for example, by divisions between skilled craftsmen and laborers—and nowhere more so than in America (with, for example, the epic struggles between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations coming close for a time to resembling a civil war within the putatively unitary movement). Where class was offered as a part of political ideology, it did not appeal solely to workers. Socialist parties, unlike trade unions, have mobilized throughout their history across class lines.

If class bases were ever central determinants of mobilization patterns, it was in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe. Before that, class was seldom the self-applied label or the basis even of workers' mobilization. Was Chartistism strictly a class movement? Though its ideology increasingly focused on class, its demands included issues with appeal to most of the range of people excluded from suffrage and effective citizenship rights in early nineteenth-century Britain (D. Thompson 1986; Jones 1984). Indeed, its admixture of members of the industrial working class with artisans, outworkers, and others presaged the fault lines of
its eventual demise. Similarly, it has been shown fairly conclusively that class-based analyses fail to explain who manned and who attacked barricades in Paris in 1848 (Traugott 1985). Even more basically, it has been argued that republicanism was the central ideological focus of the early nineteenth-century struggles in France and that class bases mattered mainly as the underpinnings of different visions of the republic (Aminzade forthcoming). The point is not that class was irrelevant but that the early nineteenth-century struggles most often taken as paradigmatic of class-based political movements—Chartism, the revolution of 1848—were political movements internally differentiated by the appeal of their ideology to different groups of workers, shopkeepers, and others.

In America, too, republicanism was a central rhetoric of political and even economic struggle. In his study of Cincinnati workers, Ross (1985) sees an effort to forge and preserve a “republican world” only giving way to an alternative, more economically and class-based form of struggles in the 1840s. This was only partly because Cincinnati was more egalitarian and socially integrated than East Coast cities. Wilentz’s study of New York also shows the centrality of republican visions into the 1820s. Even after the crucial shifts of 1828–29, the Working Men’s movement involved an attempt to push Jacksonian democracy further than the well-connected attorney’s and party functionaries of Tammany Hall. The new radicals were shaped by old Adamsite political visions and by new social movements like Owenite socialism and a mixture of feminism, deism, and Jacobinism brought forward by Frances Wright (Wilentz 1984: chap. 5). These radicals were journeyman artisans and small master mechanics but also disaffected elites; their appeals were as apt to be agrarian as focused on the transformation of urban classes. In the words of Thomas Skidmore, the program was to end social oppression and political force “till there shall be no lenders, no borrowers; no landlords, no tenants; no masters, no journeymen; no Wealth, no Want” (quoted in ibid.: 187). This was a vision that would appeal less, no doubt, to elites than to those they oppressed or exploited, but it was not a vision narrowly focused on any specific class (see Evans and Boyte 1986: chap. 4).

The communitarian visions that predominated in the movements of the era generally minimized class divisions. They offered a new kind of social relations—egalitarian and cooperative—to replace the old; they expected the beneficiaries of the old system to resist
most, but they argued that the benefit of the new order would flow to everyone. Class variation figured as a source of variable discontent and interest; class-specific patterns of association (working together, living in the same neighborhoods, intermarrying) led to mobilization partly on class lines, but this did not make these class movements. This was, after all, precisely the complaint of Marx and Engels about Owenism; they could praise its communitarianism (particularly where family was concerned) but had to attack its neglect—or denial—of class struggle (see, for example, 1976 [1848]: pt. 3).

If we turn our attention from the self-understanding of movements—or the nature of their ideological appeal—to the class character of their adherents, we find nineteenth-century NSMs in which members of the middle class predominate and others in which workers predominate. Sometimes these are different versions of related movement formations—as, for example, in the different class characteristics of American Protestant denominations and religious mobilizations. The shopkeepers’ millennium of the Second Great Awakening may have been predominantly a middle-class affair and extended to workers with an agenda of “taming” them suitably for industrial occupations (as Johnson 1978 suggests), though it is not clear that this is the whole story. The Great Awakening was also in significant part a rural phenomenon, giving birth to circuit-riding ministers and radically populist sects like the Campbellites (later the Disciples of Christ). Transcendentalism was almost entirely middle class (though Brook Farm did admit a large number of working people in 1844), but it was diametrically opposed to the evangelical awakening not only in its theology but in its social vision; it was in many ways an oppositional movement despite the elite status of many of its protagonists (Rose 1981). Abolitionism has long been interpreted as an elite and/or middle-class movement, but recent studies have begun to alter that image, holding that it did indeed mobilize significant pockets of working-class support (Drescher 1987; Fladeland 1984). Class is a significant variable for use in our analyses, but these were not class movements as such.

Self-exemplification

One of the most striking features of the paradigmatic NSMs has been their insistence that the organizational forms and styles of
movement practice must exemplify the values the movement seeks to promulgate. This means, at the same time, that the movements are ends in themselves. Relatedly, many NSMs are committed to direct democracy and a nonhierarchical structure, substantially lacking in role differentiation, and resistant to involvement of professional movement staff.

Many versions of the modern women's movement thus eschew complete identification with instrumental goals—changing legislation, achieving equal job opportunity, and other concerns. They focus also on constructing the movement itself as a nurturant, protected space for women. The emphasis on self-exemplification and noninstrumentality is indeed a contrast to much of the history of the organized labor movement. Many socialist and especially communist parties have institutionalized internal hierarchies and decision-making structures deeply at odds with their professed pursuit of nonhierarchical, nonoppressive social arrangements. But what could be a better example of making a "work-object" (in Melucci's 1989 phrase) of a social movement's own organizational forms than the communal movement(s) of the 1840s? Charles Lane, influenced by Fourier, was a veteran of several communal experiments from the anarchist Fruitlands to the Shakers; he praised celibacy and like values in 1843:

The human beings in whom the Eternal Spirit has ascended from low animal delights or mere human affections, to a state of spiritual chastity and intuition, are in themselves a divine atmosphere, they are superior circumstances, and are constant in endeavoring to create, as well as to modify, all other conditions, so that these also shall more and more conduce to the like consciousness in others. Hence our perseverance in efforts to attain simplicity in diet, plain garments, pure bathing, unsullied dwellings, open conduct, gentle behavior, kindly sympathies, serene minds. These and several other particulars needful to the true end of man's residence on earth, may be designated Family Life. . . . The Family, in its highest, divinest sense, is therefore our true position, our sacred earthly destiny. [quoted by Rose 1981: 201]

End and means are very much the same.

Communal groups were not an isolated aspect of early nineteenth-century society; they were closely linked to prominent
religious currents, leading philosophies, and the working-class movement. They were, nonetheless, distinctive in the extremes to which they took antihierarchical ideology. Most other movements of the period admitted of clearer leadership structures. Still, direct democracy was a regulative norm for many, including several branches of the workers’ movement, radical republicans, and socialists. Marx himself joined in the advocacy of immediate rights of recall over legislators who voted against the wishes of their constituents—a key issue in the relations of the 1848 Paris political clubs to the assembly (Amann 1975)—and proposed limited terms and other measures designed to minimize the development of a leadership too autonomous from the masses.

Unconventional Means

New social movements depart from conventional parliamentary and electoral politics, taking recourse to direct action and novel tactics. As Tarrow (1989) has remarked, however, this description confuses two senses of new: the characteristics of all movements when they are new, and the characteristics of a putatively new sort of movement.

It is indeed generally true that any movement of or on behalf of those excluded from conventional politics starts out with a need to attract attention; movement activity is not just an instrumental attempt to achieve movement goals, but a means of recruitment and continuing mobilization of participants. Each new movement may also experiment with new ways to outwit authorities either in getting its message across or in causing enough disruption to extract concessions or gain power. In this way, each movement may add to a repertoire of collective action (in Tilly’s 1978 phrase) that is available to subsequent movements.

In another sense, unconventional is defined not by novelty per se but by movement outside the normal routines of politics. All forms of direct action thus are unconventional, even when—like barricade fighting in Paris—they have 200 years of tradition behind them. What defines unconventional action in the political realm is mainly the attempt to circumvent the routines of elections and lobbying, whether by marching on Washington, occupying an office, or bombing the prime minister’s residence. Unconventional means in this sense are particularly likely in a movement of people
who have few resources other than their public actions. One of the key developments of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century democratic politics in Europe and societies of European settlement was the institutionalization of strong norms of conventional politics, organized primarily through political parties. This drew more than one branch of the socialist movement into the orbit of conventional politics.

Direct action was, by contrast, central to the social movements of the early to mid-nineteenth century. Revolution still seemed to be a possibility in most European countries, which gave an added punch to all forms of public protest and threatened real civil disturbance. In the French revolution of 1848, the predominant radical factions espoused a red republicanism that traced its ancestry to the 1789 revolution and called on the direct action of the people as its main means. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was the theorist of this politics, and its defeat in 1848 helped to discredit it in academic circles. Though partially sidelined, it hardly ceased to move activists, however, as the subsequent histories of syndicalism and anarchism reveal. With Georges-Eugène Sorel as a bridging theorist, this tradition of direct action also influenced fascism (Calhoun 1988). Without comparably revolutionary aims, a variety of early (and later) labor activists chose direct action both to dramatize and immediately to achieve their ends. The Luddites of early nineteenth-century England are only the most famous. Of course, restrictions on the franchise denied most of them access to the parliamentary system.

If Luddites made a virtue of necessity by direct action, Owenite socialism—and utopian socialists and communitarians generally—rejected conventional politics on principle. E. P. Thompson complains that “Owen simply had a vacant place in his mind where most men have political responses” (1968: 786). This may be, and it is also true that Robert Owen identified with elites and was not shy about approaching those in political power and trying to persuade them of the merits of his social system. Nonetheless, many of his followers had deep convictions against organizing for the pursuit of political power or the disruption of the political system. They attempted to teach by example and exposition and tried to create their own self-organizing sphere of life (Harrison 1969). The recurrent half-aesthetic, half-political romantic movements from Blake and Shelley to Ruskin, Morris, and the arts and crafts
movement similarly disdained conventional politics and were determined to carry on their work outside that tawdry sphere. Henry David Thoreau's advocacy of civil disobedience typified the emphasis on purity of conscience. His celebrated essay on the subject stemmed from his individual opposition to the draft, but the theme of direct action by the morally responsible individual tied together Thoreau's retreat to Walden and early effort to teach by striking example and his later more manifestly political and even violent common cause with John Brown (McWilliams 1973: 290–300).

Purity and freedom from corruption were not the only reasons for direct action. At least as important was the sense that organized politics and public discourse were resistant or too slow to respond. Sheer practical expediency led abolitionists to provide material assistance to runaway slaves, for example. While most early protemperance ministers stuck to lectures and essay contests, a direct action wing eventually took to saloon smashing (Rorabaugh 1979). In both cases, tensions between advocates of direct action (who also generally demanded a more complete abolition or abstinence) and adherents of more conventional politics helped to split the movements. In both cases also, the disproportionate and publicly prominent participation of women was in itself an unconventional means of action (as was even more true of women's suffrage campaigns).

Partial and Overlapping Commitments

The claim of old social movements—the labor and socialist movements—was to be able, at least potentially, to handle all the public needs of their constituents. It was not necessary to belong to a variety of special issue groups, for example, if one belonged to a trade union and, either through it or directly, to the labor party. One might struggle within a social democratic party, or within a union, to see that one's specific interests were well attended to, but one made a primary commitment to that organization or at least that movement. The NSMs, by contrast, do not make the same claims on their members or offer the same potential to resolve a range of issues at once. They are not political parties or other organizations that accept the charge of prioritizing the range of issues that compete for public attention. They are affinity groups knit together not by superordinate logic but by a web of overlap-
ping memberships, rather like the crosscutting social circles Georg Simmel (1903) thought essential to modern identity and social organization. One may thus combine feminism with pacifism and not be much moved by environmental concerns, and no organization will divert one’s feminist and pacifist dollars or envelope licking to environmentalist uses. This is described sometimes as a consumerist orientation to political involvement, with a variety of movement products to choose from. The various movements are knit together into a field but not a superordinate umbrella organization.16

So it was in the early nineteenth century: temperance, nationalism, craft struggle, communitarianism, abolitionism, free-thinking, and camp-meeting religion coexisted and sometimes shared adherents without ever joining under a common umbrella. Neither socialism nor liberalism were hegemonic movements before mid-century. Educational reform perhaps came close to being a common denominator in the early American movements (Walters 1978: 210), but it linked others rather than encompassing them.

Though there was no overall umbrella, early nineteenth-century movements nonetheless combined to create a field of activity. Movement activists were joined into networks that crisscrossed specific movements, and the broader public recognized that there were many possible movements to consider. Sometimes these movements demanded near total devotion (as did, for example, most communal settlements, at least while one remained resident in the commune). On the other hand, multiple membership, either simultaneous or serial, was common. It has been argued, for example, that modern feminism was born from the activism of women in abolition and temperance movements. In the former case, the very large number of female activists were marginalized; women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott were denied voting status and were relegated to a curtained balcony at the World Anti-Slavery Convention of 1840. After the Civil War, women made the temperance movement their own and gained experience that would translate crucially into suffrage campaigns (Evans and Boyte 1986: 80–95). Similarly, the Second Great Awakening helped to spark the militant abolitionist movement, transcendentalists were influenced by other communalists (and antagonistic to evangelicals), feminists were drawn to several of the
communitarian groups, some Chartists promoted temperance, and Wesleyan preachers found occasions to preach something like what would later be called the social gospel far too often for the comfort of the church hierarchy and sometimes wound up as trade-union leaders.¹⁷

Sometimes the personal networks of movement activists quickly expanded to touch a range of others. Consider Mary Wollstonecraft (the pioneering feminist) and William Godwin (the anarchist political philosopher). Godwin claimed credit for “converting” Robert Owen from factory management to the task of developing his social system; they met on numerous occasions. The daughter of Wollstonecraft and Godwin, Mary, eloped with Percy Bysshe Shelley (a fan of her father’s) and, while living with him and Lord Byron, wrote the story of Dr. Frankenstein’s monster. Byron of course died during his Romantic flirtation with Greek nationalism. Feminism, Owenite socialism, anarchism, nationalism, and Romanticism were thus linked in an intimate network.

The connections were not just intimate, though, but included public events and opportunities for those less involved to enter the movement field, learn its discourse, and choose among its protagonists. In April 1829, for example, in the midst of the Second Great Awakening, Robert Owen, the genius of New Lanark, journeyed to Cincinnati, Ohio, to debate a prominent evangelical clergyman, Alexander Campbell of Bethany, Virginia. The focus of the debate was on religion, with Owen out to demonstrate the superiority of rational unbelief and Campbell taking equally rationalist grounds to argue the merits of biblical Christianity. Interestingly, Owen was pushed to defend his doctrine of environmental determination against attacks by Campbell, who saw free will as essential to Christianity (a theme that was contradictory to predestination and that would become central to the evangelical upsurge of two years later). Thousands of people attended the eight days of lengthy and abstruse debate, shopping among millennial visions. Both visions were tied to movements; indeed, one of Campbell’s challenges to Owen was that if Owen were a self-consistent determinist, he would not bother so much with organizing campaigns and communities but would allow environmental pressures to do their work.¹⁸ In Campbell’s view, God’s work required the self-conscious struggle of Christians endowed with free agency. Both
men agreed, moreover, that their movements were about the radical restructuring of society at large and of personal relations; they were not debating matters of passive belief.

We are accustomed to conceptualizing Owenite socialism as a truly social movement, but it is worth affirming the same of Campbell’s revivalist religion. It was Campbell, for example, who raised the issue of gender. Pagan religions had made woman “little else than a slave to the passion and tyranny of man. The Jews rather exile her from the synagogue, as altogether animal in her nature.” By contrast, Campbell argued, “wherever Christianity has found its way, the female sex has been emancipated from ignorance, bondage, and obscurity. . . . Christianity has made you not the inferior but the companion and equal of man (Owen and Campbell 1829, 2: 123–24). Likewise, Campbell was clear that his “New Constitution” was no mere “civil religion”: patriotism was not to be confused with Christian virtue (ibid., 2: 117). As to Owen’s utilitarian conception of the end of human life as happiness based on material abundance, Campbell all but attacked the Protestant ethic itself, mocking an account in which morality “is just a due regard to utility. Bees are moral as well as men; and he is the most moral bee which creates the most honey and consumes the least of it” (ibid., 1: 18).

This debate was a major event in its day, attracting widespread attention. A transcript (taken down in stenography by a former resident of New Harmony by then drawn to Christianity) was published with both debaters’ approval and sold widely. Yet the event is hardly mentioned in accounts of either Owenite or Campbellite movements (nor in Ross’s 1985 history of Cincinnati workers). It is as though later ideas about the relationship between socialism and religion, particularly evangelical protestant religion, have rendered the connection invisible by placing the two movements in separate fields. One figures as a precursor to modern socialism, the other to a mainline protestant sect and less directly to Mormonism. What could be more different? Yet, in the early nineteenth century, especially in America, such new social movements were not only numerous but occupied a vital common space and were often linked.
WHY DID NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS HAVE TO BE REDISCOVERED?

In both early nineteenth- and late twentieth-century America and Europe a lively range of social movements emerged, different in form, content, social bases, and meaning to their participants. These were linked in social movement fields of considerable similarity. The similarities go beyond those noted above through the lens of new social movement theory. They include, for example, a lively involvement with aesthetic production and reception. The 1960s student and kindred movements are all but inconceivable without folk and especially rock music; they also nurtured an aestheticizing of the self and a wide variety of engagements with aesthetic criteria for judging personal activity and social arrangements. Feminism has been distinctive for the extent to which aesthetic production of various sorts—literature, drama, music, graphic arts—has been tied into the movement. Part of the impetus behind the ecology movement is an aesthetic judgment about nature and about appropriate lifestyles that should not be collapsed into an altogether instrumental concern for saving the earth or ourselves from extinction. This reminds us of the Romantic view of nature, and Romanticism was both an aspect of many late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century social movements and is in a sense one of those movements. A similar use of aesthetic criteria in judgments about the practical affairs of life was important to the communal movement of the early nineteenth century and to the Transcendentalists.

Of course aesthetics entered prominently into the social movement field at various other times—for example, in the era of high modernism. Nonetheless, mention of aesthetics points us toward part of the answer to a crucial question: why have the similarities between the social movement fields of the early nineteenth and late twentieth centuries not been more generally apparent to social theorists? An easy bit of the answer is simply that many social theorists know little history. It is also true that the concerns of both academic social theory and Marxism were shaped by the prominence of labor and socialist movements in the period of their origins. Variants of liberalism and conservatism dominated universities while Marxism became the dominant extra-academic radical theory, eclipsing the various utopian socialists, proponents
of direct action, and other alternative social visions of the early
nineteenth century. Thus, both in and out of academia, thus, most
theoretical orientations offered little insight into and attributed
little contemporary significance to religious movements, nation-
alism, identity politics, gender difference, sexuality, and other
concerns. This is so largely because they operate with a highly
rationalized conception of human life and a relatively fixed notion
of interests. Thus aesthetic activity and inquiry and the range of
issues raised by the NSMs were typically set apart from the "seri-
ous" issues that shaped theorists' largely instrumental inquiries
into social movements.

Indeed, even socialism itself was given a onesidedly econom-
mistic definition in classical social theory (and most of its suc-
cessor traditions). If socialism was about the struggle between
capital and labor, as Barbara Taylor has noted, what was one to do
with Robert Owen and his followers for whom "socialism repre-
sented a struggle to achieve 'perfect equality and perfect freedom'
at every level of social existence; a struggle which extended be-
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ond the economic and political reforms necessary to create a
classless society into the emotional and cultural transformations
necessary to construct a sexual democracy?" (Taylor 1983: xiv).
Socialism—and political action generally—made sense in classi-
cal social theory to the extent that it was instrumentally focused
on tangible, material goals. Social movements that were not so
oriented were necessarily relegated to the margins of theoretical
relevance.

The late nineteenth-century institutionalization of the labor/
socialist movements and the response to them crystallized the
notion of a division between sorts of movements. There was the
social movement that was tied into the overall process of industri-
alization and social change, and there was the variety of false starts
and short circuits that expressed human dreams and frustrations but
had little to do with the overall course of social change. Rather than
treating the different sorts of movements together, late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century social scientists compartmentalized
them. The very field of social movement studies shows traces of
this. Its roots lie on the one hand in sociopsychological studies of
collective behavior (generally interpreted as deviant) and on the
other in studies of the labor movement (analyzed broadly in lib-
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erall/Weberian or Marxian terms). This contributed to a tendency
to conduct argument as though the joint activity of large numbers of people must either be shown to be instrumentally rational or be deemed irrational and explicable on sociopsychological criteria (see, for example, the arguments among Smelser 1962; Smelser 1970; Currie and Skolnick 1970; Berk 1974; and Marx 1970; and the review in McAdam et al. 1988). This pattern was overdetermined by the relative paucity of historical studies among American sociologists; few looked back at major formative movements—all but inescapable to students of American history—which did not fit the prevailing divisions. The Great Awakenings, abolition, temperance—these clearly shaped American history, but they did not fit very neatly the alternatives of liberal or left, instrumental or psychologically deviant. 21

Social movement research also developed in a surprising disconnection from political analysis. This worked in both directions. Sociologists studying social movements (and even more “collective behavior”) tended for many years to focus on movements not manifestly political or to neglect the political dimensions of those they studied (Tarrow 1989: 25). Thus an academic campaign could be launched in the 1970s to “bring the state back in” to the study of social movements and related sociological phenomena (Evans et al. 1985). In this context Charles Tilly (1978, 1982, 1986), in some of the most important and influential work in the field, tied the study of social movements closely to state making and economic issues. An advance on collective behavior psychologism, this produced a kind of mirror image in which only directly political-economic, nationally integrated, and state-oriented movements received full attention.

Conversely, democratic theory long treated movements as exceptions to normal institutional political processes and often mainly as disruptions rather than central dimensions of public discourse and political agenda setting (see discussion in Cohen and Arato 1992: chap. 10). Only parts of the Marxist tradition consistently presented social movements as politically central rather than epiphenomenal. Marxists concentrated, however, not on the role of movements in ordinary democratic politics but rather in the transformation of capitalist society (and bourgeois democracy) into something else that would putatively not require such movements. Even in the wake of the social movements of the last thirty-some years, democratic theory has remained remarkably
focused on institutionalized politics (Pateman’s 1970 challenge to this still applies). When pluralist thinkers looked to the role of diverse segments of the population, they conceptualized this in terms of interest groups rather than movements (see, for example, Dahl 1956; Dahl 1961; Held 1987). Even when more critical thinkers addressed issues of direct democratic participation, their attention turned to forms of everyday citizen decision-making—that is, to an alternative set of stable, perhaps community-based routines, not to movements (for example, Barber 1984). Seymour Martin Lipset went so far as to assert that “political apathy may reflect the health of a democracy” (1963: 32). Normative democratic theory remains focused on the conceptualization of ideal routines rather than forcefully including a role for movements as continual sources of innovation.

The field of social movement research was transformed by the attempt to comprehend the civil rights movement and the antiwar and student movements of the 1960s (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Zald and McCarthy 1979; McAdam et al. 1988). The range of movements studied and the perspectives employed were broadened, and emphasis was shifted from micropsychological to macrostructural and/or rational choice accounts. Leading approaches reproduced, however, the basic division between liberal (utilitarian, rational choice, and resource mobilization) and Marxist perspectives. Most theories saw movements either as challengers for state power or as contentious groups pursuing some other set of instrumental objectives. There was little recognition of how “the personal is political” or of how important political (or more generally macrostructural) results may stem from actions that are not explicitly political or instrumental in their self-understanding. Such theories overcame the division of collective behavior from real politics, but they did not bring culture—or any rich understanding of democratic processes and civil society—to the foreground. This was done primarily by NSM theory.

NSM theory not only brought culture to the fore but challenged the sharp division between micro and macro, processual and structural accounts. In Cohen and Arato’s words, “Contemporary collective actors see that the creation of identity involves social conflict around the reinterpretation of norms, the creation of new meanings, and a challenge to the social construction of the very boundaries between public, private, and political domains of
action” (1992: 511). It is as important not to prejudge whether to apply a political process model of instrumentally rational interaction (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982) as to avoid an assumption that collective behavior stems from psychological breakdown.

CONCLUSION: MODERNITY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

For at least 200 years, under one label or another, the public has been opposed to the private; the economic to the aesthetic; the rationalist to the romantic; secularization to revival; and institutionalization to nascent movements intent on breaking free. These tensions lie behind recurrent ebbs and flows in movement organization, changing forms of movement activity, and recurrent proliferations of movements beyond any single narrative of a developing labor movement, socialism, or even democracy. This essay does not trace a longer narrative or attempt to graph the ebbs and flows of different styles of movement. Its main contributions are limited to (a) showing how prominent new social movements were in the early nineteenth century and (b) suggesting that attention should be focused not simply on a supposed transition from old to new forms of movement, but on the interplay of different sorts of movements in a social movement field that was and is not only basic to modernity but internally diverse and international. By not confounding the variety of movement characteristics with a presumed unidirectional narrative we can better discern the variables that distinguish movements of varying age in terms of their extent and forms of organization, their relative emphasis on identity politics, their social bases, and orientations to action. These are themes to which we should be alert in the study of all social movements, and we should seek to explain their absence as well as their presence.

Attuned to the richness of the social movement field in the early nineteenth and late twentieth centuries, we may see on further investigation that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not so completely dominated by economistic organization as is commonly thought. Trade unions and social democracy competed with the Salvation Army and xenophobic nationalists nearly everywhere and with revivalist preachers in America and anti-Semites in much of Europe. Academic social scientists, however,
failed to grant such other forms of movement attention proportionate to their popular appeal, while tending to expect the labor movement and mainstream party politics to grow ever stronger and more institutionalized.

If, however, it is also true, as I suggest, that the early nineteenth-century social movement field is in certain respects more similar to the late twentieth century than to the intervening years, we are faced with an interesting problem of historical explanation. The standard account of movement cycles proposed by Hirschi-man (1982) and Tarrow (1989) focuses primarily on shorter term phenomena: the way specific mobilizations exhaust participants' energies within a few months or years. But the mid-century shift in social movement activity was more than this. The struggles of many different varieties of people about the conditions and rewards of their work were increasingly joined in a single labor movement; their diverse ideologies were transformed, at least in part, into a continuum of more or less radical labor values from strong socialism to elitist unionism. Similarly, the so-called utopian socialisms faded in the face of Marxism, Fabianism, and other reform programs and social democracy. As Taylor (1983) has noted, this had striking implications for women, who had been included centrally, if asymmetrically, in Owenism but who found themselves marginalized in Marxist socialism, trade unionism, and social democratic parties. Underlying this specific instance was a general redefinition of private and public life that removed not only women but the concerns most closely identified with women—family, for example—from the public sphere, transforming political questions into merely personal concerns. It was this historically specific change—not some eternal tendency of patriarchy—that feminists later challenged with the slogan "the personal is political."

Phases of state and capitalist development were probably significant in all this (Hirsch 1988; Tarrow 1989). State elites may have become more unified and thus both better able to respond to movements and less likely to split between support and opposition. Certainly states developed better mechanisms for managing discontent (though these were hardly proof against the new, largely middle-class mobilizations of the 1960s). Not least of all, the franchise was extended, and in its wake electoral politics offered the chance to trade votes for various kinds of largely economic distributional benefits. At the same time, the institutional develop-
ment of states created mechanisms for continual negotiation over some issues—notably labor and welfare concerns. This brought certain movement concerns permanently into the political arena while leaving others out.

The concentration of large parts of the population in industrial work may also have played a role, offering unions a fertile organizing base. Perhaps more basically, workers within capitalist production were in a position (unlike most of their predecessors) to bargain for increased shares of capitalist growth. They were not asking for the protection of old crafts or the communities attached to them. There was, thus, an increasing return to investment in economistic movement organizations once workers were asking for something that capitalists could give in monetary terms. Mature industrial capitalism also posed organizational challenges to the labor movement that pushed it toward large-scale, formally organized, institutional structures. Of course, the labor movement dominated in the movement field because of its success; its dominance was an achievement of struggle, not just an inheritance from background variables. Finally, we should not fail to consider the impact of delimited events as well as trends in underlying factors. The repression of the revolutions of 1848 and the American Civil War most visibly helped to bring the early nineteenth-century burgeoning of social movements to a close. The demographic effects of both—increased migration as well as massive killing—also may have reduced the probability of movement formation and proliferation and increased popular preference for institutionalized rather than riskier forms of collective action.

I will not try to offer even a similar ad hoc list of possible factors worth exploring in the attempt to explain the reopening of the social movement field in the 1960s (or at the turn of the century). Arguments about the shift from mass-production capitalism to smaller scale, more dispersed patterns of work; about the role of new media; and about the role of the state only scratch the surface of contending positions. Perhaps demographics were again crucial; perhaps rapid social change created a sense of new possibilities. Most basically, we need to consider the possibility that proliferation of NSMs is normal to modernity and not in need of special explanation because it violates the oppositions of left and right, cultural and social, public and private, aesthetic and instrumental that organize so much of our thought. The challenge
may be to explain the relative paucity of NSMs in some periods or places. While rebellions, reforms, and other kinds of collective actions have certainly occurred throughout history, the modern era is in general distinctively characterized by a rich efflorescence of social movements. This is in part because it provides opportunities and capacities for mobilization lacking in many other epochs and settings. A proneness to various sorts of social movements, indeed, seems to be one of the features that links the distinctive history of Western modernity to the novel modernities being pioneered on the Indian subcontinent, in China, in Africa, and elsewhere.

It is a mistake thus to equate the mid-nineteenth- to mid-twentieth-century pattern simply with modernity. This helps, among other things, to nourish illusions about what it could mean to pass into postmodernity. The relative predominance of a single cluster of movements during this period is not necessarily either more typical than the proliferation of different movements both before and after it; indeed, it may be less so. The seeming dominance of labor and social democracy—whether in European actuality or only in the minds of social scientists—is historically specific and contingent. There never was the social movement of modernity. Rather, modernity was internally split and contested from the beginning—or perhaps I should say was “always already” the object of contending movements.

We need to constitute our theoretical notion of modernity not as a master narrative but in a way that reflects both its heterogeneity and contestation and that takes full account of the central place of social movements within it. If we are to discern a postmodernity, a change of tendency, or a trend, we need more clearly to know what we may be moving beyond. State power and capitalism have not been transcended; neither has competitive individualism passed away nor the world of merely instrumental relations become inherently more spiritual. Many of the grievances and dissatisfactions that drove the movements of the early nineteenth century remain. Likewise, the proliferation of new social movements should not be taken too quickly to spell the end of trade union activism or mainstream political and economic concerns as movement themes. The cycle may continue. In any case, modernity remains visible, in part, precisely in the shape of the movements challenging it and asking for more from it.
NOTES

1. Tilly (see also 1982) focuses overwhelmingly on contentious action challenging the growing state. He finds the social movement to be invented in Britain only with Chartism and the rise of a movement integrated on a national scale, addressing the state as the central societal actor and voicing contentious, largely economic demands. He is concerned to distinguish "proactive," modern movements from "reactive" or defensive ones. This echoes the way Karl Marx and other late nineteenth-century reformers and radicals distinguished their mobilizations and programs from those of their predecessors and more old-fashioned contemporaries. This definition of what really counts as a serious social movement shaped nearly all subsequent attention to the matter, including studies of the early nineteenth century. It is in part from this definition that E. P. Thompson (1968) struggled to escape (while remaining in the Marxist-radical fold) with his account of "class as happening" and his inclusive attention to a range of unconventional movements. At some points, Tilly focuses less on the overall "modernization" process and comes closer to Thompson's position (though he never fully sorts out his position on culture and "voluntarism"): The "long-run reshaping of solidarities, rather than the immediate production of stress and strain, constituted the most important impact of structural change on political conduct" (Tilly et al. 1974: 86).


3. Political sociologists have consistently tended to work with an idea of what counts as properly political that marginalizes religion, even where it seems obviously central to the phenomena under study. As Matthews (1969: 26-27) remarked of Lipset's The First New Nation, "What is surprising and not a little distressing about Lipset's study of a changing and growing new nation is that he never explained how it got to be so religious."


5. In focusing on the early nineteenth century, I do not wish to argue that NSMs ceased to be prominent in the second half of the nineteenth century or the first half of the twentieth. On the contrary, some of the same NSMs maintained or returned to prominence—as, for example, the Women's Christian Temperance Union of the 1870s and 1880s succeeded the American Temperance Union of the 1830s and 1840s. The followers of W. K. Kellogg, promoter of abstinence and cold cereals in the early twentieth cen-
tury, were not so different from those of Sylvester Graham, the "peristaltic
persuader" and inventor of the Graham cracker in the 1830s (Nissenbaum
1989). Many manifestations of antimodernism in late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century intellectual circles involve NSM activity (Lears 1981).
There is no ready index for assessing when movement activity is greater or
lesser, so my impressionistic comparative judgment is open to challenge,
though I think there can be little doubt that the early nineteenth century was
particularly active.

This account is indebted to discussions with George Steinmetz; see also
Steinmetz 1990.

1 See, for example, Sean Wilentz's very qualified tracing of the episodic ap-
ppearance of some form of class consciousness among New York workers
involved in a variety of other identities and never quite reducible to proletari-
an: "Between 1820—the annus mirabilis of New York artisan radicalism—
and 1850, both a process and a strain of consciousness emerged in numerous
ways from the swirl of popular politics, in which people came at various
points to interpret social disorder and the decline of the Republic at least
partly in terms of class divisions between capitalist employers and em-
Working Class (1968), Wilentz's Chaos Democratic suggests in its subtitle
a rise of the American working class that implies a stronger unity than is
revealed in its rich account of diversity, particularly between an earlier arti-
san and Republican politics and a later (but less examined) working-class
politics and trade-union organization.

2 "In the past decade or two, conflicts have developed in advanced Western
societies that deviate in various ways from the welfare-state pattern of institu-
tionalized conflict over distribution. They no longer flare up in domains
of material reproduction; they are no longer channeled through parties and
associations; and they can no longer be allayed by compensations. Rather,
these new conflicts arise in domains of cultural reproduction, social integra-
tion, and socialization; they are carried out in subinstitutional—or at least
extraparlamentary—forms of protest; and the underlying deficits reflect a
reification of communicatively structured domains of action that will not
respond to the media of money and power. The issue is not primarily one
of compensations that the welfare state can provide, but of defending and
restoring endangered ways of life" (Habermas 1988: 392). See the similar
argument in Bell (1982).

3 Part of the confusion comes from failing to distinguish two senses of utop-
ian. The programs of neocorporatist social democratic parties may be all
encompassing and in that sense utopian, but they are eminently negotiable
and not necessarily radical. Feminist calls for an end to all violence and
discrimination against women are in a sense defensive but are also both
radical and nonnegotiable, and in that sense utopian. In different ways, each
utopian goal may be unreachable in the world as we know it, a shared sense
of the term.

4 I focus here mainly on America, but this generalization seems to hold in
considerable degree for Britain, France, the low countries, and Scandinavia.
There were of course local variations, like the extent to which linguistic
standardization or religious establishment were major political issues. In central, eastern, and southern Europe, the generalization is more problematic, both in timetable and in content. The issue of national unification of course transformed German politics; that of the reorganization and/or breakup of empire was critical in Austria-Hungary and its successor states. Indeed, one can see some consistency between the extent of this domestic normalization of politics and international alliances in this period, but I do not want to push that line very far. It should also be noted that national unification of other sorts was a central theme in American politics of the second half of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century. Not just the defining conflict of the Civil War, but the recurrent question of the incorporation of western territories kept the national definition of the Union on the agenda.

Despite the opposition of such feminists as there were, in 1893 the United States made distribution of birth control devices or advice illegal, indeed criminal (Gordon 1990: 94). The feminist movement of the 1840s did have successors (like the free-love movement of the 1870s), but these have been obscured until recently from historical writing just as they were repressed (and partly because they were repressed) by contemporary political morality. As Gordon (1990: 24) notes, "Religious and political leaders denounced sexual immorality increasingly after mid-century."

In a different, less Marxist class scheme one could look for disproportionate NSM mobilization among the "dominated fraction of the dominant class" and others who have more cultural than economic capital (Bourdieu 1984).

He somewhat misleadingly identifies this with the early nineteenth century, when the numbers of industrial workers were certainly growing but (a) remained very small and (b) did not constitute the core of the nascent labor movement that was rooted more in artisans and protoindustrial works like outworkers (see various essays in Katznelson and Zolberg 1987).

Tucker (1997) has, however, convincingly addressed French syndicalism as a new social movement, suggesting the limits to any reading of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as unproblematically the era of the "old" labor and social democratic movements.

Cohen and Arato (1992: 493) term this "self-limiting radicalism," but they unnecessarily assume that action not focused on the state is not deeply radical in some senses and that its adherents accept existing political and economic arrangements: "Our presupposition is that the contemporary movements are in some significant respects 'new.' What we have in mind, above all, is a self-understanding that abandons revolutionary dreams in favor of radical reform that is not necessarily and primarily oriented to the state. We shall label as 'self-limiting radicalism' projects for the defense and democratization of civil society that accept structural differentiation and acknowledge the integrity of political and economic systems."

This does not mean that all potential identities enter such a field with equal chances of becoming the basis of action or commitment. As Cohen and Arato (1992: 511) summarize Touraine's view, "the various institutional potentials of the shared cultural field, and not simply the particular identity of a particular group, comprise the stakes of struggle" (original emphasis).
Projects of identity formation became identity politics largely by making demands—for example, at a minimum, for recognition—on the cultural field as such.

17 Individuals and groups could unite many of the widespread themes. Adin Ballou, the founder of the Hopedale community, for example, described it as a “missionary temperance, antislavery, peace, charitable, woman’s rights, and educational society” (Walters 1978: 49). While guiding Hopedale, he was a lecturer for temperance and the American Anti-Slavery Society, and president of the pacifist and Christian anarchist New England Non-Resistance Society.

18 Moreover, Campbell asked why Owen’s views differed so from those of other men raised under similar circumstances (Owen and Campbell 1829, 1:236).

19 Weber of course made a variety of contributions to the analysis of cultural movements and their relationship to politics and economics, but these are noteworthy partly because of their atypicality. They do not, in any case, overcome his tendency to analyze contemporary phenomena largely in terms of instrumental pursuit of interests—including culturally constituted interests like status. Durkheim and Mauss each thought nationalism important after World War I (which did not take startling perspicacity), but neither wrote a major work on it or, indeed, on social movements generally.

20 This is linked not just to the issues thematized in this paper, but also to the relative neglect of emotions as a theme in social movement analysis (except as part of accounts of psychosocial deviance) and until recently in sociology generally.

21 It is perhaps no accident that one of the few classic social movement studies to break out of these dualisms was Joseph Gusfield’s (1963) historical study of the temperance movement (which treats it largely in terms of the “status politics” by which new or upwardly mobile social groups affirmed their distinctive identity and place in the social order).

22 Trying to make sense of the New Left, Alvin Gouldner (1970: vii) contemplated the song “Light My Fire,” recorded by Jim Morrison and the Doors. He saw it in two guises: “an ode to urban conflagration” sung during the Detroit riots, and a singing commercial for a Detroit carmaker. The question, in other words, was between political resistance and economic hegemony. What Gouldner missed, apparently, was the centrality of sex to the New Left as to so much of the rest of the new social movement ferment of the era (as of the early nineteenth century).

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