

Angela Mendelovici

Curriculum Vitae

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Employment

Current employment

- Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Western University (2018–present)
- Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University (2010–present)
- Associate Member, Brain and Mind Institute, Western University (2014–present)

Past employment

- Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Western University (2010–2018)
- Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University (Jan. 2011–July 2011, Jan. 2012–July 2012)

Education

- Ph.D., Philosophy, Princeton University (2005–2010)
- B.A., Philosophy Honors (Minor in Psychology), McGill University (2001–2005)

Research areas

- Philosophy of mind (intentionality, consciousness, perception, concepts), philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, metaphysics, epistemology

Publications and works in progress

Monograph

- Mendelovici, A. (2018). *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Oxford University Press.

Articles

- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (forthcoming). Kolors Without Colors, Representation without Intentionality. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Brentano on Phenomenal and Transitive Consciousness, Unconscious Consciousness, and Phenomenal Intentionality. *European Journal of Philosophy*.
- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2020). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions. In Luis R. G. Oliveira and Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.). *Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker*. Routledge.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). Olfactory Experience, Content, and Justification. In Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia (eds.). *The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). The Combination Problem is a Problem for Everyone. In William Seager (ed.). *Handbook for Panpsychism*. Routledge.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Reply to Philip Woodward’s Review of *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*. *Philosophical Psychology* 32 (8): 1261–1267.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Immediate and Reflective Senses. In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado, and Dena Shottenkirk (eds.). *Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics*. Routledge.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2018). Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). *Non-propositional Intentionality*. Oxford University Press.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation. *Disputatio* 8 (42): 57–92.
- Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality>>
- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. *Philosophy Compass* 9 (5): 325–337.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Pure Intentionalism about Moods and Emotions. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind*. Routledge, pp. 135–157.
- Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Tracking Representationalism: Lycan, Dretske, and Tye. In Andrew Bailey (ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers*. Continuum, pp. 209–235.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Intentionalism about Moods. *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1): 126–136.
- **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation (2013). *Philosophical Studies* 165 (2): 421–443.

- Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P., **Mendelovici, A.**, McGeer, V., and Wheatley, T. (2011). Is Morality Unified? Evidence that Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 23 (10): 3162–3180.

Book reviews

- **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). Review of Laura Candiottto’s (ed.) *The Value of Emotions for Knowledge*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
- **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2019). Review of Karen Neander’s *A Mark of the Mental*. *Philosophical Review* 128 (3):378–385.
- **Mendelovici A.** (2014). Review of Dominic Gregory’s *Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and their Contents*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
- **Mendelovici A.** and Bourget, D. (2013). Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague’s (eds.) *Cognitive Phenomenology*. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 91 (3):601–604.
- **Mendelovici A.** (2013). Review of Tim Bayne’s *The Unity of Consciousness*. *Philosophical Psychology* 26 (1):158–162.
- **Mendelovici A.** and Nielsen, K. (2012). Review of Steward Goetz and Charles Taliaferro’s *A Brief History of the Soul*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

Works in progress

- Symposium paper on Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne’s *Narrow Content* (commissioned for *Inquiry*, co-authored with David Bourget)
- Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception (commissioned for *The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception*, edited by Berit Brogaard, Robert French, and Otavio Bueno, *Synthese Book Series*)
- Symposium paper on David Papineau’s *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (commissioned for *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind*)
- Critical review of David Papineau’s *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (commissioned for *Analysis Reviews*)
- TBA (commissioned for special issue of *Synthese* on Declan Smithies’ *The Epistemic Role of Consciousness* and related themes)
- Debunking Arguments Against Colors
- Phenomenal Intentionality and a Voluntaristic Theory of Truth and Reference
- Olfactory Objects: Everyday Objects and Bare Olfactory Objects
- *Deep Internalism* (book project on internalism, intentionality, and truth and reference)
- *The Phenomenal World* (book project on consciousness, intentionality, and epistemic contact with the world)

Other

- “Intentionality, Consciousness, and Panpsychism (with Professor Angela Mendelovici)” (2019). Interview on *Tent Talks* conducted Cody Turner. <<https://codyturnercreations.com/2019/08/17/37-intentionality-consciousness-and-panpsychism-with-professor-angela-mendelovici/>>
- “Amy Kind and Angela Mendelovici on Representationalism About Moods” (2013). *Philosophy TV* episode with Amy Kind. <<http://www.philostv.com/amy-kind-and-angela-mendelovici>>
- “A Sample Philosophy Paper” (2010). <http://prezi.com/z4h1_fwilbxj>

Presentations

Upcoming presentations

- “Deep internalism”
 - Indiana University, Bloomington, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, April 2021
 - Keynote speaker at IUSS Online Workshop, “Analytic Phenomenology, Intentionality and Consciousness”, October 13–15 2021
- TBA
 - DEX Philosophy Conference, University of California, Davis, TBA (postponed indefinitely due to COVID-19)
- TBA
 - 44th Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy in Honor of Ruth Millikan, October 2022 (initially scheduled for May 2021 but postponed due to COVID-19)

Past presentations

- “Phenomenal intentionality”
 - Guest at Ned Block and David Chalmers’ NYU Mind & Language seminar “Theories of Intentionality” (April 2021)
- “Debunking arguments against color”
 - Invited session at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, April 2021 (initially scheduled for April 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19)
- Author meets critics session on my *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality* (critics: Elijah Chudnoff, Amy Kind, and Adam Pautz)
 - Invited session at the meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, December 2020 (initially scheduled for March 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19)
- Commentary on Sarah Arnaud and Kate Pendoley’s “Intentionalism and the understanding of emotion experience”

- Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, December 2020 (initially scheduled for March 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19)
- “Deep internalism”
 - Oxford University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk in “Metaphysics of Consciousness” Series, February 2021
 - Summer of Consciousness, June 2021 (organized by Uriah Kriegel)
- “Phenomenal intentionality, thought, and cognitive phenomenology” and “Truth and reference on the aspect view”
 - Central European University Summer School, Cognitive Phenomenology, July 2019
- “The phenomenal intentionality theory,” “Thoughts, unconscious states, and other challenging cases for the phenomenal intentionality theory,” and “The phenomenal basis of truth and reference”
 - Phenomenal Intentionality: A Workshop with Angela Mendelovici, Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019
- “Complexity without combination: Panpsychism without the combination problem”
 - Session on panpsychism, Towards the Science of Consciousness, Interlaken, June 2019
- “The phenomenal basis of intentionality”
 - University of Turin, Department of Philosophy and Education Science, invited talk on my *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, May 2019
- “The phenomenal basis of truth and reference”
 - Concordia University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, January 2020
 - The Role and Reality of Consciousness, University of Crete, Rethymnon, Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, May 2019
 - University of Notre Dame, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, April 2019
- “Phenomenal intentionality in perception”
 - Phenomenal Intentionality Workshop, St. Raffaele University, Milan, May 2019
 - Winter Workshop in Philosophy of Perception, UC San Diego, February 2019
 - Session on Perception, Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, March 2019
- “Doing without external acquaintance”
 - Acquaintance and Direct Grasp, Institut Jean Nicod, July 2018
- “Mental combinations”
 - Russellian Monism: Time for the Details, Central European University, August 2017
 - Consciousness and Intentionality, University of Crete, Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, July 2017
- “The superficial character and deep nature of intentional states and contents”
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, June 2017

- “Fixing reference on intentionality and the mismatch problem”
“The phenomenal intentionality theory and self-ascriptivism”
 - Mind, Matter, and Consciousness, Central European University Summer School, July 2016
- “Phenomenal intentionality in thought”
 - Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network (SPAWN), Consciousness, 10th Anniversary Conference, July 2015 (upcoming)
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, Symposium of Intentionality, June 2013
- “Immediate and reflective senses”
 - Oakland University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2015
 - Victoria University at Wellington, Department of Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Invited Talk, May 2014
 - Keynote address for *PhilMiLCog 2014*, The University of Western Ontario, May 2014
- “Phenomenal intentionality and the derived content strategy” (with David Bourget)
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, Symposium on Phenomenal Intentionality, May 2014
- “Is the phenomenal intentionality theory naturalistic?” (with David Bourget)
 - Mardi Gras in Mind, Tulane University, February 2014
- “Intentionalism about moods”
 - 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, August 2013
- “Comments on David Bourget ‘Representationalism and perceptual distortion’”
 - Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, June 2013
- “Mental representation is not a relation”
 - American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March 2013
 - University of Toronto, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2013
 - McMaster University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2013
- “How concepts get their contents”
 - University of Wisconsin–Madison, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, February 2013
 - Yeshiva University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, February 2013
- “The derived content view” (with David Bourget)
 - Interfaces of the Mind, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, July 2012
 - Intentionality and Phenomenality Conference, University of Crete, Heraklion, Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, June 2012
- “The role of phenomenal consciousness in thought”
 - University of Melbourne, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, March 2012
 - Mind and Consciousness Conference, The University of Western Australia, February 2012
 - Hong Kong University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, January 2012

- “The conscious experience of pain”
 - Wellesley College, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, November 2011
- “Intentionalism about emotions”
 - Wayne State University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Oct. 2011
 - Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2011
 - Charles Sturt University at Wagga Wagga, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, July 2011
 - ANU Women’s Work-in-Progress Seminar, May 2011
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, Sept. 2009
- “Phenomenal intentionality meets conceptual atomism”
 - European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Milan, Sept. 2011
- “Do phenomenal characters compose?”
 - Consciousness at the Beach, The Australian National University, July 2011
- “Perceptual subcapacities: Tracking and representation”
 - Perceptual Capacities Workshop, The Australian National University, July 2011
- “All cognitive content is conscious content”
 - The Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences, Philosophy Program, Invited Talk, Jan. 2011
- “A moderate position on the phenomenology of thought”
 - The University of Western Ontario, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - Washington University at St. Louis, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - The University of Waterloo, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Jan. 2010
 - Cornell University, Department of Philosophy, Invited Talk, Feb. 2010
- “Comments on Pekka Väyrynen’s ‘Thick concepts and presupposition’”
 - Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Aug. 2010
- “Comments on Chandra Sripada’s ‘The deep self model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action’”
 - Moral Psychology Conference, Princeton University, Nov. 2008
- “The varieties of content”
 - Philosophical Society, Research School of Social Sciences, Philosophy Program, The Australian National University, Aug. 2008
- “Derived mental representation”
 - Meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2008
- “Does intentional content supervene on phenomenal character?”
 - Eighth Annual International Graduate Conference in Philosophy: Experience and Truth, University of Toronto, May 2008

- “Systematic error about color and what to do about it”
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, April 2008
- “Derived mental representation and the phenomenology of thought”
 - University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2008
- “Causal theories of mental representation and the mismatch problem”
 - Eleventh Annual Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, CUNY, March 2008
 - University of Minnesota Graduate Philosophy Conference, “Philosophy on Ice,” Feb. 2008
 - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, Nov. 2007

Teaching

2021–2022

- Philosophy 1230F: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230G: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2020–2021

- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (blended)
- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 9xxxA: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)

2017–2018

- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (blended)
- Philosophy 9617A: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)
- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind

2016–2017

- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (online)
- Philosophy 1200: Critical Thinking and Reasoning (blended)

2015–2016

- Philosophy 4410F/9617A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind

2013–2014

- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
- Philosophy 4410G/9611A: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind
- Consciousness and Intentionality Prospectus Course (prospectus reading course)

2012–2013

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9661A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Propositional Attitudes Prospectus Course (graduate reading course)
- Panpsychism (graduate reading course)

2011–2012

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9605: Concepts (graduate/undergraduate seminar)

2010–2011

- Philosophy 2260F: Introduction to Philosophy of Language (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4991F/9407: Problems in Philosophy: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Foundations Seminar: Mental Representation (graduate seminar, ANU)
- Non-Veridical Representation (undergraduate reading course)

Graduate supervision (PhD and MA)

- Yen-Tung Lee, on virtual reality (PhD supervisor, ongoing)
- Shawn Bartlett, on representationalism and evaluative states (PhD supervisor, ongoing)
- Peter Verveniotis, on linguistic representation and phenomenal intentionality (PhD supervisor, ongoing)
- Kyler Furlotte, *Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: Is Ontology Relevant?* (MA supervisor, completed 2016)
- Stephen Pearce, *A Pure Representationalist Account of the Attitudes* (PhD supervisor, completed 2016)
- Christopher Young, *Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact* (PhD joint-supervisor, completed 2015)

- Gregory Horne, *The Root of the Combination Problem for Panpsychism* (MA supervisor, completed 2013)
- Stephen Pearce, *Sense Modalities and Representationalism* (MA supervisor, completed 2011)

Graduate advising (PhD)

- Andrew Peterson, *Assessing Decision-Making Capacity After Severe Brain Injury* (completed 2016)
- Nicolas McGinnis, *Reference and Experiment* (completed 2015)
- O’Neal Buchanan, *Rethinking Empathy: Value and Context in Motivation and Adaptation* (completed 2015)
- Matthew Ivanowich, *Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology* (completed 2015)
- James Southworth, *William James Theory of Emotion* (completed 2014)

Awards

- Dean’s Travel Fund, Western University, 2010–2011, 2012–2013, 2015–2016, 2016–2017, 2017–2018
- Faculty Research Development Fund, Western University, 2017–2018, 2018–2019
- Teaching Honour Roll, Western University, 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, 2014–2015, 2015–2016

Service

- Graduate Chair, Western University, starting July 1, 2021
- Visiting Speakers Committee, Western University, July 1, 2020–June 30, 2021
- Graduate Admissions Committee, Western University, 2016–17, 2017–2018
- Chair of Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, Western University, 2017–2018
- Appointments Committee, Western University, 2012–2013, 2016–2017
- Workload Committee, Western University, 2016–2017
- Language and Mind Area Chair, Western University, 2012–2014
- Chair of Visiting Speakers Committee, Western University, 2013–2014
- Canadian Philosophical Association Programme Committee, 2013–2014
- Co-chair of the Committee for Women’s Concerns, Western University, 2011–2013
- Visiting Speakers Committee, Western University, 2011–2012

– Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, Western University, 2010–2012

April 19, 2021