Classical Studies 2902B

[Note: on 12^th January, 2010, we shall start by considering briefly the Spartan and Theban Supremacies in Greece (bring class notes from last lecture), and thereafter we shall proceed to the following. CLM]

The Reign of Philip of Macedon

P.’s early life; his status in Maced. royal family. State of Macedonia in his youth. Sent as hostage to Thebes in (probably) 369-367. Learned much of new Theban military tactics and Greek politics. How he came to be king, though dates are not certain (359? 358? or even 356?). (How successors were chosen in Maced. is not at all clear; compare situation at time of Alexander’s death in 323; only clear item is that successor had to be member of Argead family.)

P.s reform of Macedonian army: numerous elements which were combined in various ways for battle. Most important point is that the army was not a levy or militia, but full-time professional body: P. could drill it and make it quick in response and flexible on the battlefield. Main parts: Companion Cavalry (elite force of noble Macedonians); also strong Thessalian cavalry. Foot companions (new idea), recruited from peasantry; their units (syntagmata): important feature is sarissa (c. 16 feet long pike, counter-weighted and held in both hands); small shield on left arm; not heavy armour; its uses in battle (not main striking force). Other foot forces. All travelled fairly light on campaign and therefore covered ground quickly. Also elite infantry forces--Hypaspists: basic hoplites who served to cover right flank of phalanx: from Maced. elite of some degree; 3000 strong; also served as foot guards for A.; fought alongside Agrianians (elite skirmishers).

All units, then, were full-time and operated as “combined forces”. Also many mercenaries and other forces from all over the Aegean area. Philip could afford (gradually—see his career) to pay for all this.

P. always kept the army busy; so we find him moving about and switching from one place to another with great frequency and rapidity. This makes any detailed account of his career complex and confusing. So, only main outline will be given—with particular emphasis on his various ways of dealing with opponents. First two years or so are crucial-and will be analysed to show his methods. Later developments bring in one or two other gambits, but key point is that P. was answerable to no one and could, after consultation with advisers, make rapid decisions and get on with things—something which his opponents, espec. in democracies, simply could not do. (So how does a democracy wage war against a dictatorship? cf. Churchill in Britain in 2^nd World War.) Main points to note; in early years P. is particularly occupied in strengthening Macedonia and expanding its “home area”; thereafter he tries to get rid of Athenian influence in the N. Aegean area; and all the time he seems to move in circles—but, as time goes by, the circles get larger and larger: he moves into Central Greece and later into the Peloponnese. Importance of the idea of “eunoia” (“good-will”) as means of making friends and influencing people. Also, note importance of “sacred wars” in Greece, especially with regard to the so-called “Delphic Amphictyony”.

Final great battle of independent Greek city-states at Chaeronea in autumn of 338. P.’s treatment of his defeated opponents, espec. Athens and Thebes. Creation of new Hellenic league, under Maced. leadership (“League of Corinth”). Its structure; its purpose. First moves against Persia in spring of 336. P’s death—who was responsible?